scholarly journals Domain Globalization: Using Languages to Support Technical and Social Coordination

2015 ◽  
pp. 70-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julien Deantoni ◽  
Cédric Brun ◽  
Benoit Caillaud ◽  
Robert B. France ◽  
Gabor Karsai ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Coordination

Identity and social coordination: Self-concept confusion yields high-maintenance interactions

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caitlin W. Duffy ◽  
Wendi L. Gardner ◽  
Eli J. Finkel
Keyword(s):  
Self Concept ◽  
Social Coordination

Myopic Stackelberg Equilibria and Social Coordination in a Share Contract Fishery

1986 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raimo P. Hämäläinen ◽  
Jukka Ruusunen ◽  
Veijo Kaitala
Keyword(s):  
Social Coordination ◽  
A Share

scholarly journals Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Roberto Rozzi
Keyword(s):  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
The Other ◽  
Group Interactions ◽  
Social Coordination ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Stochastic Stability Analysis ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost

We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent’s group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability of outcomes in the long run using stochastic stability analysis. We find that three elements matter for the equilibrium selection: the group size, the strength of preferences, and the information’s cost. If the cost is too high, players never learn the group of their opponents in the long run. If one group is stronger in preferences for its favorite action than the other, or its size is sufficiently large compared to the other group, every player plays that group’s favorite action. If both groups are strong enough in preferences, or if none of the groups’ sizes is large enough, players play their favorite actions and miscoordinate in inter-group interactions. Lower levels of the cost favor coordination. Indeed, when the cost is low, in inside-group interactions, players always coordinate on their favorite action, while in inter-group interactions, they coordinate on the favorite action of the group that is stronger in preferences or large enough.

scholarly journals Network formation and social coordination

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanjeev Goyal ◽  
Fernando Vega-Redondo
Keyword(s):  
Network Formation ◽  
Social Coordination

Navigating the complex social ecology of screen-based activity in video-mediated interaction

Pragmatics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ufuk Balaman ◽  
Simona Pekarek Doehler
Keyword(s):  
Conversation Analysis ◽  
Search Engine ◽  
Practical Problem ◽  
Social Ecology ◽  
Dyadic Interactions ◽  
Social Coordination ◽  
Task Accomplishment ◽  
Task Oriented

Abstract Task-oriented video-mediated interaction takes place within a complex digital-social ecology which presents, to participants, a practical problem of social coordination: How to navigate, in mutually accountable ways, between interacting with the remote co-participants and scrutinizing one’s own screen –which suspends interaction–, for instance when searching for information on a search engine. Using conversation analysis for the examination of screen-recorded dyadic interactions, this study identifies a range of practices participants draw on to alert co-participants to incipient suspensions of talk. By accounting for such suspensions as being task-related through verbal alerts, typically in the form let me/let’s X, participants successfully ‘buy time’, which allows them to fully concentrate on their screen activity and thereby ensure the progression of task accomplishment. We discuss how these findings contribute to our understanding of the complex ecologies of technology-mediated interactions.

Social Coordination Assessment: Distinguishing between Shape and Timing

2013 ◽  
pp. 9-18
Author(s):  
Emilie Delaherche ◽  
Sofiane Boucenna ◽  
Koby Karp ◽  
Stéphane Michelet ◽  
Catherine Achard ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Coordination
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