The Foundations of Social Coordination: John Searle and Hernando de Soto

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Smith
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kober ◽  
Jan G. Michel
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Hallie Liberto
Keyword(s):  

This article explores warnings and threats through the lens of popular illocutionary taxonomies. It argues that if we tap into moral philosophy to help carve out some important distinctions between types of warnings and threats, we find that these more specific concepts do constitute illlocutions. It shows that the principles used by John Searle, Kent Bach, and John Harnish to differentiate the categories of illocutions can be employed to analyze warnings and threats. When unconditional, warnings generally have what Searle calls an assertive illocutionary point, and threats a commissive (commitment-making) illocutionary point. However, the best way to explain conditional threats or warnings is through a combination of illocutions. The article concludes by describing a specific type of threat: noncommittal threats. It argues that noncommittal threats, unlike all other threats, involve assertions.


1986 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raimo P. Hämäläinen ◽  
Jukka Ruusunen ◽  
Veijo Kaitala
Keyword(s):  

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Roberto Rozzi

We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent’s group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability of outcomes in the long run using stochastic stability analysis. We find that three elements matter for the equilibrium selection: the group size, the strength of preferences, and the information’s cost. If the cost is too high, players never learn the group of their opponents in the long run. If one group is stronger in preferences for its favorite action than the other, or its size is sufficiently large compared to the other group, every player plays that group’s favorite action. If both groups are strong enough in preferences, or if none of the groups’ sizes is large enough, players play their favorite actions and miscoordinate in inter-group interactions. Lower levels of the cost favor coordination. Indeed, when the cost is low, in inside-group interactions, players always coordinate on their favorite action, while in inter-group interactions, they coordinate on the favorite action of the group that is stronger in preferences or large enough.


1982 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hurka

John Searle has charged R.M. Hare's prescriptivist analysis of the meaning of ‘good,’ ‘ought’ and the other evaluative words with committing what he calls the ‘speech act fallacy.’ This is a fallacy which Searle thinks is committed not only by Hare's analysis, but by any analysis which attributes to a word the function of indicating that a particular speech act is being performed, or that an utterance has a particular illocutionary force. ‘There is a condition of adequacy which any analysis of the meaning of a word must meet,’ Searle writes, ‘and which the speech act analysis fails to meet. Any analysis of the meaning of a word must be consistent with the fact that the same word (or morpheme) can mean the same thing in all the different kinds of sentences in which it can occur.' Hare maintains that the word ‘good’ is used to indicate the speech act of prescribing. He maintains that one of the principal functions of this word is to indicate that utterances of sentences containing it have prescriptive illocutionary force, and that an analysis of its meaning must make explicit and ineliminable reference to this force-indicating function. But ‘good’ regularly occurs in sentences utterances of which appear to have no prescriptive illocutionary force.


Dialogue ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 703-713
Author(s):  
Michael Gorman
Keyword(s):  

RésuméAu cœur de la philosophie de John Searle se trouve une compréhension biologique de l'esprit. Mais il y a une tension dans sa position. D'un côté, la biologie moderne, telle qu'il la comprend, requiert une certaine conception de la normativité. D'un autre côté, la façon dont Searle lui-même comprend l'intentìonnalité requiert une conception très différente de la normativité. Pour résoudre la difficulté, Searle devrait à la fois modifier sa compréhension de la biologie et nuancer son idée que l'esprit est un phénomène biologique comme n'importe quel autre.


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