Handling Agents’ Incomplete Information in a Coalition Formation Model

2016 ◽  
pp. 55-70
Author(s):  
Souhila Arib ◽  
Samir Aknine ◽  
Thomas Genin
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Formation Model

scholarly journals An Experimental Study of Self-Enforcing Coalitions

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Jandoc ◽  
Ruben Juarez
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Rational Behavior ◽  
Behavioral Factors ◽  
Formation Model ◽  
Economic Experiment ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Over Time

We study a model in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We conduct an economic experiment using this model to investigate possible behavioral factors that may explain deviations from theoretical predictions. The main findings show that agents display rational behavior when forming coalitions, especially when they know that a large proportion of their opponents play myopic strategies from the outset. Over time, however, agents learn to behave more strategically and even more rationally, thus enabling agents to display more of the behavior predicted by the coalition formation model with farsighted agents.

Experiments on robustness and deception in a coalition formation model

2006 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. V. Belmonte ◽  
R. Conejo ◽  
J. L. Perez-de-la-Cruz ◽  
F. Triguero
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Formation Model

A robust deception-free coalition formation model

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria-Victoria Belmonte ◽  
Ricardo Conejo ◽  
J. L. Pérez-de-la-Cruz ◽  
Francisco Triguero
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Formation Model
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