0-RTT Key Exchange with Full Forward Secrecy

2017 ◽  
pp. 519-548 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Günther ◽  
Britta Hale ◽  
Tibor Jager ◽  
Sebastian Lauer
Keyword(s):  
Key Exchange ◽  
Forward Secrecy

Perfect Forward Secrecy of Authentication and Key Exchange Protocols in Three Versions of WAPI

2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (7) ◽  
pp. 1108-1113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chun-Jie Cao ◽  
Chao Yang ◽  
Xing-Hua Li ◽  
Yuan Bo Guo ◽  
Jian Feng Ma
Keyword(s):  
Key Exchange ◽  
Forward Secrecy ◽  
Key Exchange Protocols ◽  
Perfect Forward Secrecy

An Authenticated Key Exchange with Perfect Forward Secrecy for Two Message Diffie-Hellman Type Protocols

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 325-329
Author(s):  
Tribid Debbarma ◽  
◽  
Anupam Jamatia ◽  
Kunal Chakma ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Key Exchange ◽  
Authenticated Key Exchange ◽  
Forward Secrecy ◽  
Diffie Hellman ◽  
Perfect Forward Secrecy

scholarly journals An efficient identity-based key exchange protocol with KGS forward secrecy for low-power devices

2007 ◽  
Vol 378 (2) ◽  
pp. 198-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Zhu ◽  
Guomin Yang ◽  
Duncan S. Wong
Keyword(s):  
Low Power ◽  
Key Exchange ◽  
Power Devices ◽  
Key Exchange Protocol ◽  
Forward Secrecy ◽  
Identity Based

scholarly journals Non-invertible Public Key Certificates

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis Lizama-Pérez ◽  
J. Mauricio López
Keyword(s):  
Public Key Infrastructure ◽  
Key Exchange ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Key Exchange Protocol ◽  
Forward Secrecy ◽  
Certification System ◽  
Perfect Forward Secrecy

Post-quantum public cryptosystems introduced so far do not define an scalable public key infrastructure for the quantum era. We demonstrate here a public certification system based in Lizama’s non-invertible Key Exchange Protocol which can be used to implement a public key infrastructure (PKI), secure, scalable, interoperable and efficient. We show functionality of certificates across different certification domains. Finally, we discuss that non-invertible certificates can exhibit Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).

scholarly journals Parallel network file systems using authenticated key exchange protocols

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 161
Author(s):  
S. Sathya ◽  
M. Ranjith Kumar ◽  
K. Madheswaran
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
File Systems ◽  
Key Exchange ◽  
Distributed File Systems ◽  
Authenticated Key Exchange ◽  
Forward Secrecy ◽  
Storage Devices ◽  
Key Exchange Protocols ◽  
Parallel Network ◽  
Metadata Server

The keyestablishment for secure many-to-many communications is very important nowadays. The problem is inspired by the proliferation of large-scale distributed file systems supporting parallel access to multiple storage devices. In this, a variety of authenticated key exchange protocols that are designed to address the issues. This shows that these protocols are capable of reducing the workload of the metadata server and concurrently supporting forward secrecy and escrow-freeness. All this requires only a small fraction of increased computation overhead at the client. This proposed three authenticated key exchange protocols for parallel network file system (pNFS). The protocols offer three appealing advantages over the existing Kerberos-based protocol. First, the metadata server executing these protocols has much lower workload than that of the Kerberos-based approach. Second, two of these protocols provide forward secrecy: one is partially forward secure (with respect to multiple sessions within a time period), while the other is fully forward secure (with respect to a session). Third, designed a protocol which not only provides forward secrecy, but is also escrow-free.

scholarly journals Certificateless Non-Interactive Key Exchange Protocol with Forward Secrecy

2015 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-546
Author(s):  
Young Kyung Lee ◽  
Ji Eun Eom ◽  
Seung-Hyun Seo ◽  
Dong Hoon Lee
Keyword(s):  
Key Exchange ◽  
Key Exchange Protocol ◽  
Forward Secrecy

scholarly journals A Provably Secure Revocable ID-Based Authenticated Group Key Exchange Protocol with Identifying Malicious Participants

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsu-Yang Wu ◽  
Tung-Tso Tsai ◽  
Yuh-Min Tseng
Keyword(s):  
Key Exchange ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Key Exchange Protocol ◽  
Forward Secrecy ◽  
Group Key ◽  
Computation Technique ◽  
Group Key Exchange ◽  
Security Properties ◽  
Authenticated Group Key ◽  
Provably Secure

The existence of malicious participants is a major threat for authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocols. Typically, there are two detecting ways (passive and active) to resist malicious participants in AGKE protocols. In 2012, the revocable identity- (ID-) based public key system (R-IDPKS) was proposed to solve the revocation problem in the ID-based public key system (IDPKS). Afterwards, based on the R-IDPKS, Wu et al. proposed a revocable ID-based AGKE (RID-AGKE) protocol, which adopted a passive detecting way to resist malicious participants. However, it needs three rounds and cannot identify malicious participants. In this paper, we fuse a noninteractive confirmed computation technique to propose the first two-round RID-AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants, which is an active detecting way. We demonstrate that our protocol is a provably secure AGKE protocol with forward secrecy and can identify malicious participants. When compared with the recently proposed ID/RID-AGKE protocols, our protocol possesses better performance and more robust security properties.

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