Differential Games in Health-Care Markets: Models of Quality Competition with Fixed Prices

2017 ◽  
pp. 145-167
Author(s):  
Kurt R. Brekke ◽  
Roberto Cellini ◽  
Luigi Siciliani ◽  
Odd Rune Straume
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Differential Games ◽  
Health Care Markets ◽  
Quality Competition ◽  
Fixed Prices

Increasing Competition Between Providers in Health Care Markets: The Economic Evidence

2011 ◽  
pp. 670-687 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Propper ◽  
George Leckie
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Health Care Systems ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Health Care Markets ◽  
Economic Evidence ◽  
Care Systems ◽  
Fixed Prices ◽  
The Impact

This article scrutinizes the empirical literature on competition between providers and finds that the outcomes are highly varied, and that competition generates winners and losers among patients as well as providers. It examines the theoretical and empirical economic evidence on the effect of greater competition between providers in health care markets. Most of the evidence focuses on a narrow set of outcomes, primarily the effect of competition on prices and quality of health care, sometimes with a focus on winners and losers. It discusses the impact of centrally fixed prices on competition and examines the role of information in increasing competition is also discussed. It examines the effects of using centrally set prices. This article concludes raising some issues that seem to be pertinent for policymakers interested in increasing competition in their health care systems.

scholarly journals Competition and equity in health care markets

2019 ◽  
Vol 64 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luigi Siciliani ◽  
Odd Rune Straume
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Health Care Markets ◽  
Equity In Health ◽  
Equity In Health Care

scholarly journals Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (2) ◽  
pp. 473-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate Ho ◽  
Robin S. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Health Care Markets ◽  
Social Incentives ◽  
Provider Networks ◽  
Hospital Networks ◽  
Private Incentives ◽  
Social Surplus ◽  
Optimal Networks

We evaluate the consequences of narrow hospital networks in commercial health care markets. We develop a bargaining solution, “Nash-in-Nash with Threat of Replacement,” that captures insurers’ incentives to exclude, and combine it with California data and estimates from Ho and Lee (2017) to simulate equilibrium outcomes under social, consumer, and insurer-optimal networks. Private incentives to exclude generally exceed social incentives, as the insurer benefits from substantially lower negotiated hospital rates. Regulation prohibiting exclusion increases prices and premiums and lowers consumer welfare without significantly affecting social surplus. However, regulation may prevent harm to consumers living close to excluded hospitals. (JEL C78, D85, G22, H75, I11, I13, I18)

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