Kripke, Saul Aaron: Naming and Necessity

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-3
Author(s):  
Christian Tapp
Keyword(s):  
Naming And Necessity

Naming and Necessity in Iatmul

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Moutu
Keyword(s):  
Papua New Guinea ◽  
New Guinea ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Metaphysical Necessity ◽  
Naming And Necessity ◽  
Naming Practices

This chapter discusses the process of naming amongst the Daribi, Iqwaye, and Iatmul societies in Papua New Guinea. Amidst the discussion on the Daribi and the Iqwaye is a philosophical discussion of naming and necessity. The theoretical intention of the chapter is to suggest how the category of relationships can be conceptualised as a metaphysical necessity in ontological terms. It attempts to concretise this in terms of naming practices.

CCCP

2020 ◽  
pp. 251-274
Author(s):  
Bob Hale
Keyword(s):  
Identity Theory ◽  
C Fibre ◽  
Naming And Necessity ◽  
Do So

This chapter is concerned with Crispin Wright’s critique, in his 2002 “The Conceivability of Naturalism,” of the well-known argument developed in Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity against the identity of pain with C-fibre firing. Kripke argued that if the identity held it would do so necessarily, so that the identity theorist would have the task of explaining away the apparent conceivability of pain without C-fibre firing and C-fibre firing without pain. Wright identified a principle underlying Kripke’s argument (the “Counter-Conceivability Principle,” to the effect that a clear and distinct conception of a situation is the best possible evidence of its possibility), and suggested that Kripke’s deployment of it against the identity theory resulted in failure. The present chapter raises some doubts about the details of Wright’s diagnosis of the flaw in Kripke’s argument, and makes a contribution of its own to our understanding of the aetiology of modal illusion.

On Naming and Possibility in Kripke and in the Tractatus

1998 ◽  
pp. 19-25
Author(s):  
María Cerezo
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Rigid Designator ◽  
Rigid Designators ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
Naming And Necessity ◽  
Theories Of Meaning ◽  
Model Dimension

Raymond Bradley has put forward an essentialist interpretation of the ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus and aims to develop the model dimension that is implicit therein. Among other theses, Bradley maintains that tractarian names can be interpreted as Kripkean rigid designators; this idea enables him to approach the Tractus from the perspective of possible worlds semantics. I reassess Bradley's thesis by examining the tractarian notion of name and the Kripkean concept of rigid designator in Naming and Necessity, and consider whether an interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators is possible. I also discuss similarities and differences between the two theories of meaning.

Kripke, Cartesian Intuitions, and Materialism

1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-238
Author(s):  
George Sher
Keyword(s):  
Identity Theory ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Initial Section ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Naming And Necessity

In his influential “Naming and Necessity,” Saul Kripke has deployed a new sort of analytical apparatus in support of the classical Cartesian argument that minds and bodies must be distinct because they can be imagined separately. In the initial section of this paper, I shall first paraphrase Kripke's version of that argument, and then suggest a way in which even one who accepts all of its philosophical presuppositions may avoid its conclusion. In the second section, I shall defend this suggestion against some of the possible objections to it.Recent materialists have not been overly impressed by the Cartesian claim that minds and bodies (mental states and physical states, etc.) can be imagined or conceived separately from each other. Their usual reply is that this is only to be expected, given the contingent nature of the identify involved. Kripke, however, has argued persuasively that such a reply is unacceptable because it overlooks a crucial fact about the terms in which the identity theory is couched.

Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity

2005 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-430
Author(s):  
Frederick Kroon ◽  
Jonathan McKeown-Green
Keyword(s):  
Naming And Necessity

Naming and Necessity

1983 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 93-94
Author(s):  
Jack Kaminsky ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Naming And Necessity

Do Proper Names Always Rigidly Designate?

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 475-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Nute
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
Single Individual ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Referring Expressions ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Naming And Necessity

Many philosophers have claimed possible worlds semantics is incoherent because of insoluble problems involved in the notion of identifying a single individual in different worlds. One frequent approach to trans-world identification has been to assume that all the possible worlds, complete with their populations, are described by means of qualities alone prior to our considering the question of identification of the same individual in each world in which it exists. If we interpret possible worlds semantics in this way, trans-world identification could only be accomplished on the basis of some properties the individual has uniquely in every world in which it exists. This becomes problematic since the individual doesn't have the same properties in every world. In ‘Naming and Necessity’ and ‘Identity and Necessity’ Saul Kripke rejects such an account of both possible worlds and trans-world identification, developing an alternative interpretation of the new semantics. His approach involves a distinction between referring expressions which designate different individuals in different worlds according to the distribution of properties within each world and referring expressions which designate the same individual in every world.

De Sousa On Kripke And Theoretical Identities

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. M. Yoshida
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Rigid Designator ◽  
Rigid Designators ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Identity Statement ◽  
Naming And Necessity

In the by now well known talks he gave at Princeton, Saul Kripke claimed that “[t]heoretical identities … are generally identities involving two rigid designators and therefore are examples of the necessary a posteriori.” (Published as “Naming and Necessity,” in G. Harmon and D. Davidson, eds., Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht, 1972) 253-355; (hereafter referred to as “NN”; this quote p. 331.) A rigid designator is an expression that designates the same object in all possible worlds when it is used. So Kripke is claiming that ‘Water is H20’ and ‘Heat is the motion of molecules’ are generally identities involving expressions like ‘water’ and ‘the motion of molecules’ which designate the same objects in all possible worlds. If the identity statement is true, both sides designate the same object rigidly, i.e., in all possible worlds, and therefore the statement is necessarily true. On the other hand, whether it is true is determined ultimately by appeal to experience. It follows that if true, the identity is necessary a posteriori.

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