HOW TO NOT MIX WORDS AND OBJECTS

В статье я излагаю свои соображения по поводу статьи Евгения Борисова, помещённой в этом выпуске журнала. Попутно я излагаю своё видение проблем кросс-мировой предикации и кросс-идентификации. Я полагаю, что межмировое тождество невозможно и что главная задача состоит в обеспечении идентификации. Для этого можно использовать либо метод поддержания когнитивного контакта либо метод двойников, отождествляемых по набору существенных признаков. Он определяется прагматически. Метод жёстких десигнаторов также ведёт к интенсиональной логике, поскольку в языке-объекте должны присутствовать релятивизованные к мирам имена объектов. Борисов пытается построить логику кросс-мировой предикации сразу на нескольких основаниях, которые плохо совместимы друг с другом. Он квантифицирует по возможным индивидам, но при этом пытается опереться на метаязыковые имена индивидов как на основание для кросс-идентификации, метаязыковое имя индивида становится аргументом для функции значения, хотя не является жёстким десигнатором. Ключевая операция системы Борисова - назначение двойника в возможном мире - спрятана за функцией f, которая выступает в роли условия идентификации, т. е. прочерчивает кросс-мировую линию. На мой взгляд, система имеет потенциал, но нуждается в додумывании и уточнении. In this article, I present my comments on the article by Evgeny Borisov, which is included in this issue of the journal. Along the way, I set out my vision of the problems of cross-world predication and cross-identification. I believe that cross-world identity is impossible, and that the main task is to provide identification. To do this, you can use either the method of keeping cognitive contact, or the method of counterparts identified by a set of essential features, which is defined pragmatically. The method of rigid designators leads to intensional logic, since the object language must contain object names that are relativized to worlds. Borisov is trying to build the logic of cross-world predication on several bases at once, which are poorly compatible with each other. He quantifies over the domain of possible individuals, but at the same time he tries to rely on the metalinguistic names of individuals as a basis for cross-identification, the metalinguistic name of an individual becomes an argument for the value function, although it is not a rigid designator. The key operation of Borisov’s system is the appointment of a counterpart in a possible world. It is hidden behind the function f, which acts as a condition for identification, that is, it draws a cross-world line. In my opinion, the system has some good prospects, but it needs to be thought out and refined.

Contextual Influences on Reference

This chapter considers a number of ways in which the understood reference of a definite noun phrase—definite description, pronoun, demonstrative, indexical, or proper name—may depend on the context in which it is uttered. Contextual influences are reflected in phenomena such as anaphora and familiarity presuppositions, descriptive incompleteness, domain restriction, dependence on a shifted perspective in intensional contexts resulting in de re, de dicto, and de se interpretations, and inclusion of context-sensitive predicates. Careful investigation of particular types of context dependence has played an important role in the evolution of semantic theories of these NP types over the past fifty years. But outstanding puzzles about how context influences reference pose challenges to the most influential current semantic theories of some NP types, including direct reference theories of indexicals and demonstratives, and rigid designator accounts of proper names.

On Naming and Possibility in Kripke and in the Tractatus

Raymond Bradley has put forward an essentialist interpretation of the ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus and aims to develop the model dimension that is implicit therein. Among other theses, Bradley maintains that tractarian names can be interpreted as Kripkean rigid designators; this idea enables him to approach the Tractus from the perspective of possible worlds semantics. I reassess Bradley's thesis by examining the tractarian notion of name and the Kripkean concept of rigid designator in Naming and Necessity, and consider whether an interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators is possible. I also discuss similarities and differences between the two theories of meaning.

The pragmatic fallacies of the New Theory of Reference

As is well known, according to the "new" theory of reference, the reference relation can be carried out by means of rigid designators whose relationship with the object they designate cannot be analyzed away. Moreover, the new theorists claim, the category of proper names in a natural language marks almost invariably rigid designators. In this paper, both claims are rejected. Using distinctions between the referential system (which determines which entities the primitive symbols of language refer to in each possible world) and the identification system (which determines which member of one world is identical with which member of another), and between two types of object identification (public and perspectival), it is argued that the use of a noun phrase as a rigid designator is predicated on the assumption that a language user knows who (or what) the noun phrase refers to in the actual world. The conclusion is that rigid designation is not a conceptually irreducible reference relation, nor are proper names always used as rigid designators.

On the Difference Between Non-Connoting Terms and Rigid Designators: A Reply to Bradley

A main point of my article, as I see it, is that we can solve Putnam's problem, as articulated in the first paragraph of section three, without recourse to the definition of “natural-kind term” as “rigid designator of a natural kind”. I had three main objections to this definition:(a) It makes the classification of a term as a natural-kind term dependent on one's metaphysics, i.e., on the status given to natural kinds. However, Putnam's argument seems to be independent of such metaphysical considerations, and the sort of natural kinds it establishes (if any) should be “read off its face”, not set down in advance (section 2).(b) It permits the derivation of “exotic necessary truths” such as “If water is H20 then necessarily water is H20” (sections 9 and 10).(c) Putnam's main point appears to be about the independence of a term's extension from a linguistic community's beliefs. Why should this point affect the theory of designation? Kripke's argument about names establishes the non-descriptiveness of names while leaving undisturbed the classical conception of names designating individuals. Why should we not take his and Putnam's parallel arguments as establishing the non-descriptiveness (non-connotation) of natural-kind terms while leaving undisturbed the classical conception of general terms designating classes (section 10)?

De Sousa On Kripke And Theoretical Identities

In the by now well known talks he gave at Princeton, Saul Kripke claimed that “[t]heoretical identities … are generally identities involving two rigid designators and therefore are examples of the necessary a posteriori.” (Published as “Naming and Necessity,” in G. Harmon and D. Davidson, eds., Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht, 1972) 253-355; (hereafter referred to as “NN”; this quote p. 331.) A rigid designator is an expression that designates the same object in all possible worlds when it is used. So Kripke is claiming that ‘Water is H20’ and ‘Heat is the motion of molecules’ are generally identities involving expressions like ‘water’ and ‘the motion of molecules’ which designate the same objects in all possible worlds. If the identity statement is true, both sides designate the same object rigidly, i.e., in all possible worlds, and therefore the statement is necessarily true. On the other hand, whether it is true is determined ultimately by appeal to experience. It follows that if true, the identity is necessary a posteriori.