HOW TO NOT MIX WORDS AND OBJECTS

В статье я излагаю свои соображения по поводу статьи Евгения Борисова, помещённой в этом выпуске журнала. Попутно я излагаю своё видение проблем кросс-мировой предикации и кросс-идентификации. Я полагаю, что межмировое тождество невозможно и что главная задача состоит в обеспечении идентификации. Для этого можно использовать либо метод поддержания когнитивного контакта либо метод двойников, отождествляемых по набору существенных признаков. Он определяется прагматически. Метод жёстких десигнаторов также ведёт к интенсиональной логике, поскольку в языке-объекте должны присутствовать релятивизованные к мирам имена объектов. Борисов пытается построить логику кросс-мировой предикации сразу на нескольких основаниях, которые плохо совместимы друг с другом. Он квантифицирует по возможным индивидам, но при этом пытается опереться на метаязыковые имена индивидов как на основание для кросс-идентификации, метаязыковое имя индивида становится аргументом для функции значения, хотя не является жёстким десигнатором. Ключевая операция системы Борисова - назначение двойника в возможном мире - спрятана за функцией f, которая выступает в роли условия идентификации, т. е. прочерчивает кросс-мировую линию. На мой взгляд, система имеет потенциал, но нуждается в додумывании и уточнении. In this article, I present my comments on the article by Evgeny Borisov, which is included in this issue of the journal. Along the way, I set out my vision of the problems of cross-world predication and cross-identification. I believe that cross-world identity is impossible, and that the main task is to provide identification. To do this, you can use either the method of keeping cognitive contact, or the method of counterparts identified by a set of essential features, which is defined pragmatically. The method of rigid designators leads to intensional logic, since the object language must contain object names that are relativized to worlds. Borisov is trying to build the logic of cross-world predication on several bases at once, which are poorly compatible with each other. He quantifies over the domain of possible individuals, but at the same time he tries to rely on the metalinguistic names of individuals as a basis for cross-identification, the metalinguistic name of an individual becomes an argument for the value function, although it is not a rigid designator. The key operation of Borisov’s system is the appointment of a counterpart in a possible world. It is hidden behind the function f, which acts as a condition for identification, that is, it draws a cross-world line. In my opinion, the system has some good prospects, but it needs to be thought out and refined.

“I Said Something Wrong”: Transworld Obligation in Yesterday

Danny Boyle's film Yesterday (2019) is a contemporary morality play in which the main character, Jack Malik, a failing singer-songwriter, is magically sent to a different possible world in which the Beatles never existed. Possessing his memory of the Beatles’ catalogue in the new possible world, he is now in sole possession of an extremely valuable artifact. Recording and performing the songs of the Beatles and passing them off as his own, he becomes rich, famous, and deeply unhappy. Once he confesses his wrong-doing, however, he is redeemed and his life becomes wonderful. The presupposition that underlays the plot is that in claiming authorship of the songs of the Beatles in a world in which the Beatles never existed, he is acting immorally. But on what theoretical grounds can this intuitive judgment be justified? Can one plagiarize work for which there is no author in one's world? Saul Kripke, in Naming and Necessity, dubs terms that refer in all possible worlds to be “rigid designators” and considers the metaphysics necessary to support them. In this case, it is not reference but moral responsibility that is invariant under changes of possible world and so we must ask a similar question for “rigid obligators.” We argue that a virtue ethics approach is the only way to support the foundational moral intuition.

Kripke on Identity Statements

We show that Kripke’s argument for the necessity of identity statements relating objects a and b by their rigid designators demands an additional significant premise.

Modal Types

Modal logic flourished throughout the twentieth century. Kripke provided a semantics in terms of possible world recognized by mathematicians to be an example of varying sets. This allows a formulation in terms of monads generated by adjunctions. Modal homotopy type theory adds the radical idea that modalities apply to all types, not just propositions, so as to make sense of possible steps and necessary ingredients. The proximity is shown between the structures discovered by modal logicians and common ideas in mathematics of stability under variation. We can then reformulate many ideas in current philosophical metaphysical uses of modal logic, such as rigid designators, counterparts, the de re/de dicto distinction, and so on. Worlds are understood as extended contexts, allowing a formulation of counterfactuals. A form of temporal logic is also easily generated in the same vein.

An Argument for the Obstinate Rigidity of Proper Names

A recent argument suggests that proper names are persistently rigid designators. Invoking the Kaplanian distinction between a world of the context of utterance and a world of the circumstance of evaluation, the argument maintains that names have to designate something only in the former, but not in the latter, implying thus that the designated objects must exist only in the former world. This paper shows that names designate something in both kinds of world and are thus obstinately rigid. This is achieved in three steps. First, the author argues that the contents of names must be available in possible worlds regardless of whether the named objects exist in them. Second, the author argues that these contents are expressed by English names in both kinds of world. Third, since Millianism suggests that names express contents by way of designating objects, the author argues that they have to designate something in both kinds of world.

Rigidity and Contingency

At least since Kripke (1980) it has been generally accepted that true identity statements involving proper names are necessarily true. This view is allegedly supported by our most ordinary, pretheoretic intuitions according to which ordinary proper names are rigid designators. This paper challenges the established status of this view. Section 1 develops the context of the debate by presenting the intuitions of rigidity and of contingency of identity found among competent speakers. Section 2 shows how the latter constitute a serious problem for the received view, one that cannot be easily ignored. Section 3 considers three available proposals intended to solve the problem and shows why they fail. Section 4 briefly describes a way to make compatible the intuitions of rigidity and of contingency, a consequence of which is the acceptance of the possibility of contingently true identity statements. Finally, section 5 considers some philosophical consequences of accepting such a view.

Linguistic Meaning, Rigid Designators, and Legal Philosophy

This essay is intended to engage some of the controversies that have emerged in legal philosophy concerning the theory of linguistic meaning we should adopt with reference to the law. In particular, I will focus on two theories of linguistic meaning that have opposing positions both on the nature of meaning, and the consequences this might have for law and legal objectivity. The first can be called plain meaning view. The plain meaning theory claims that the meaning of legal terms is a settled thing, and it is the duty of legal officials, especially judges, to simply apply that meaning to a given case in hand. In modern American jurisprudence, the plain meaning theory is often associated with various originalist figures, most notably the late Antonin Scalia who called his iteration of the plain meaning theory “textualism.” For this reason, I will largely be focusing on Justice Scalia’s account. The second theory of linguistic meaning I will be examining can be called the indeterminate theory. The indeterminate theory holds that there is no set or foundational meaning to any semantic term in the law which can be objectively applied by legal practitioners.

Hylemorphism, rigid designators, and the disembodied ‘Jesus’: a call for clarification

Many in the Christian tradition affirm two things: (1) that Jesus Christ descended to Hades/Limbus Patrumon Holy Saturday and (2) that the human nature of Jesus is a hylemorphic compound, the unity of a human soul and prime matter. I argue that (1) and (2) are incompatible; for the name ‘Jesus’, ‘Christ’, and ‘Jesus Christ’ rigidly designates a human being. But, given a certain view of hylemorphism, the human being, Jesus, ceased to exist in the time between his death and resurrection. So, Jesus did not descend to Hades/Limbus Patrum, even if God the Son did.