Kripke, Cartesian Intuitions, and Materialism

1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-238
Author(s):  
George Sher
Keyword(s):  
Identity Theory ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Initial Section ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Naming And Necessity

In his influential “Naming and Necessity,” Saul Kripke has deployed a new sort of analytical apparatus in support of the classical Cartesian argument that minds and bodies must be distinct because they can be imagined separately. In the initial section of this paper, I shall first paraphrase Kripke's version of that argument, and then suggest a way in which even one who accepts all of its philosophical presuppositions may avoid its conclusion. In the second section, I shall defend this suggestion against some of the possible objections to it.Recent materialists have not been overly impressed by the Cartesian claim that minds and bodies (mental states and physical states, etc.) can be imagined or conceived separately from each other. Their usual reply is that this is only to be expected, given the contingent nature of the identify involved. Kripke, however, has argued persuasively that such a reply is unacceptable because it overlooks a crucial fact about the terms in which the identity theory is couched.

CCCP

2020 ◽  
pp. 251-274
Author(s):  
Bob Hale
Keyword(s):  
Identity Theory ◽  
C Fibre ◽  
Naming And Necessity ◽  
Do So

This chapter is concerned with Crispin Wright’s critique, in his 2002 “The Conceivability of Naturalism,” of the well-known argument developed in Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity against the identity of pain with C-fibre firing. Kripke argued that if the identity held it would do so necessarily, so that the identity theorist would have the task of explaining away the apparent conceivability of pain without C-fibre firing and C-fibre firing without pain. Wright identified a principle underlying Kripke’s argument (the “Counter-Conceivability Principle,” to the effect that a clear and distinct conception of a situation is the best possible evidence of its possibility), and suggested that Kripke’s deployment of it against the identity theory resulted in failure. The present chapter raises some doubts about the details of Wright’s diagnosis of the flaw in Kripke’s argument, and makes a contribution of its own to our understanding of the aetiology of modal illusion.

Mind, identity theory of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Central Nervous System ◽  
Nervous System ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Ontological Categories ◽  
Great Merit ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

We know that the brain is intimately connected with mental activity. Indeed, doctors now define death in terms of the cessation of the relevant brain activity. The identity theory of mind holds that the intimate connection is identity: the mind is the brain, or, more precisely, mental states are states of the brain. The theory goes directly against a long tradition according to which mental and material belong to quite distinct ontological categories – the mental being essentially conscious, the material essentially unconscious. This tradition has been bedevilled by the problem of how essentially immaterial states could be caused by the material world, as would happen when we see a tree, and how they could cause material states, as would happen when we decide to make an omelette. A great merit of the identity theory is that it avoids this problem: interaction between mental and material becomes simply interaction between one subset of material states, namely certain states of a sophisticated central nervous system, and other material states. The theory also brings the mind within the scope of modern science. More and more phenomena are turning out to be explicable in the physical terms of modern science: phenomena once explained in terms of spells, possession by devils, Thor’s thunderbolts, and so on, are now explained in more mundane, physical terms. If the identity theory is right, the same goes for the mind. Neuroscience will in time reveal the secrets of the mind in the same general way that the theory of electricity reveals the secrets of lightning. This possibility has received enormous support from advances in computing. We now have at least the glimmerings of an idea of how a purely material or physical system could do some of the things minds can do. Nevertheless, there are many questions to be asked of the identity theory. How could states that seem so different turn out to be one and the same? Would neurophysiologists actually see my thoughts and feelings if they looked at my brain? When we report on our mental states what are we reporting on – our brains?

Do Proper Names Always Rigidly Designate?

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 475-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Nute
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
Single Individual ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Possible Worlds Semantics ◽  
Referring Expressions ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Naming And Necessity

Many philosophers have claimed possible worlds semantics is incoherent because of insoluble problems involved in the notion of identifying a single individual in different worlds. One frequent approach to trans-world identification has been to assume that all the possible worlds, complete with their populations, are described by means of qualities alone prior to our considering the question of identification of the same individual in each world in which it exists. If we interpret possible worlds semantics in this way, trans-world identification could only be accomplished on the basis of some properties the individual has uniquely in every world in which it exists. This becomes problematic since the individual doesn't have the same properties in every world. In ‘Naming and Necessity’ and ‘Identity and Necessity’ Saul Kripke rejects such an account of both possible worlds and trans-world identification, developing an alternative interpretation of the new semantics. His approach involves a distinction between referring expressions which designate different individuals in different worlds according to the distribution of properties within each world and referring expressions which designate the same individual in every world.

De Sousa On Kripke And Theoretical Identities

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. M. Yoshida
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
The Other ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Rigid Designator ◽  
Rigid Designators ◽  
Necessary A Posteriori ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Identity Statement ◽  
Naming And Necessity

In the by now well known talks he gave at Princeton, Saul Kripke claimed that “[t]heoretical identities … are generally identities involving two rigid designators and therefore are examples of the necessary a posteriori.” (Published as “Naming and Necessity,” in G. Harmon and D. Davidson, eds., Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht, 1972) 253-355; (hereafter referred to as “NN”; this quote p. 331.) A rigid designator is an expression that designates the same object in all possible worlds when it is used. So Kripke is claiming that ‘Water is H20’ and ‘Heat is the motion of molecules’ are generally identities involving expressions like ‘water’ and ‘the motion of molecules’ which designate the same objects in all possible worlds. If the identity statement is true, both sides designate the same object rigidly, i.e., in all possible worlds, and therefore the statement is necessarily true. On the other hand, whether it is true is determined ultimately by appeal to experience. It follows that if true, the identity is necessary a posteriori.

Armstrong's Materialism

1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-592
Author(s):  
George S. Pappas
Keyword(s):  
Central Nervous System ◽  
Nervous System ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Central State ◽  
The Central Nervous System ◽  
David Armstrong

Central-state materialism ( = CSM) is a very strong, but also very exciting theory of mind according to which each mental state is identical with a state of the central nervous system. CSM thus goes considerably beyond early versions of the identity theory of mind, since those early accounts (e.g., those of Place and Smart) held only that sensations are to be identified with neural events. CSM, by contrast, is a thesis about all mental states; every mental state is held to be a state of the central nervous system. In fact, as we will see shortly, CSM is an even more sweeping thesis than this formulation of it suggests, since it is not concerned simply with mental states.One prominent defender of CSM, David Armstrong, has maintained that CSM can be established by means of a two-step argument.

scholarly journals Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity

2004 ◽  
Vol 36 (108) ◽  
pp. 115-130
Author(s):  
Maite Ezcurdia
Keyword(s):  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Scott Soames ◽  
Naming And Necessity

Este libro tiene dos propósitos principales, uno explícito y otro implícito. El propósito explícito es completar la agenda semántica de Saul Kripke en El nombrar y la necesidad (en adelante, NN); en particular, desarrollar temas y responder a preguntas que surgen de las discusiones en NN. Dos grupos de temas le interesan a Soames. El primero concierne a los nombres propios, así como a las oraciones de identidad y a las atribuciones de actitudes proposicionales que los contienen; el segundo a los términos de clase natural y a las oraciones de identidad que los contienen. Las propuestas de Soames sobre estos temas corresponden al propósito implícito del libro: ofrecer una teoría semántica de corte milliano y russelliano sobre los nombres propios, los términos de clase natural, las oraciones de identidad y las atribuciones de actitudes  roposicionales. Dicha teoría semántica es russelliana por cuanto asume que las proposiciones están constituidas por las referencias de las partes significativas de las oraciones estructuradas de cierta forma, y es milliana por cuanto supone que los significados de los nombres propios se agotan con sus referentes.

scholarly journals Studi Kritis Terhadap Teori Identitas Pikiran-Otak Mario Bunge: Perspektif Neo-Sadrian

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 139
Author(s):  
Cipta Bakti Gama
Keyword(s):  
Brain Function ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Current Development ◽  
Mulla Sadra ◽  
New Form

<div><p><strong>Abstract :</strong> The aim of this research is to conduct a critical analysis of Mario Bunge’s view that mental reality is identical with the reality of brain function known as mind-brain identity theory. The analysis is performed using Neosadrian perspective, i.e. a new form of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy which is developed by Tabataba‘i and his disciples. The author tries to elucidate the main claims held by Bunge and to launch some critiques upon those claims. The main conclusions achieved through this research include the following. Firstly, mind-brain identity theory cannot be accepted. Secondly, current development of scientific studies corroborating certain relations between brain and mental states does not justify the validity of the identity theory, also does not falsify its opposition. Thirdly, a religious-sufistical philosophy, such the Neosadrian, can be consistent with current development of scientific research.</p><p><em>Keywords :</em> <em>Mind-brain  identity  theory,  Mario  Bunge, Neo-Sadrian,  science,  religious-sufistical philosophy.</em></p><p> </p><p><strong>Abstrak :</strong> Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk melakukan analisis kritis atas pandangan Mario Bunge bahwa realitas pikiran identik dengan realitas fungsi otak, yang dikenal dengan teori identitas pikiran- otak. Analisis tersebut dilakukan dengan menggunakan sudut pandang Neosadrian, yaitu bentuk baru filsafat Mulla Sadra yang dikembangkan oleh Tabataba‘i dan murid-muridnya. Penulis mencoba menguraikan sejumlah klaim utama yang dipegang oleh Bunge tentang teori identitas tersebut dan melancarkan kritik terhadapnya. Sejumlah kesimpulan utama yang bisa dicapai melalui penelitian ini mencakup hal-hal berikut. Pertama, teori identitas pikiran-otak tidak bisa diterima. Kedua, perkembangan studi saintifik yang menguatkan adanya relasi antara status otak dan status mental tidak menjustifikasi validitas teori identitas pikiran-otak, juga tidak memfalsifikasi dualitas esensi keduanya. Ketiga, filsafat yang bercorak religius-sufistik seperti Neo-Sadrian bisa konsisten dengan perkembangan sains mutakhir.</p><p>Kata kunci : <em>teori identitas pikiran-otak, Mario Bunge, Neo-Sadrian, sains, filsafat religius-sufistik.</em></p></div>

Kripke, Saul Aaron (1940–)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arif Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Meaningful Use ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Formal Treatment ◽  
Causal Connections ◽  
Essential Properties ◽  
Naming And Necessity

Saul Kripke is one of the most influential philosophers to have written on logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind in the twentieth century. In logic, he made an early and seminal contribution to the formal treatment of modality, that is, thoughts and statements about how things might have been or must have been (§2). In metaphysics, his work on modality has also been important, contributing as it did to the revival of the Aristotelian idea that the ways a thing might have been or must be (its contingent and its essential properties) were features of that very thing itself. This was in opposition to the view, prevalent in various forms throughout the first half of the twentieth century, that necessity was always relative to some classification or description of the object (§3). In the philosophy of language, he attacked– – in Naming and Necessity – the Russellian idea that proper names are simply abbreviated descriptions of the things that they name, arguing that instead they can refer directly to things via causal connections of which the users of language might be unaware (§4). Again, in the philosophy of language, his work on Wittgenstein on rule-following evinced what seemed to be a radical and devastating skepticism about the very possibility of the meaningful use of language (§6). And his proposed solution constituted a novel re-interpretation of Wittgenstein’s "private language argument," one that seemed to reveal the essentially social character of language (§8). In the philosophy of mind, he used the semantic machinery developed in Naming and Necessity to revive the long-discredited Cartesian argument against identifying mental and physical states (§5). Saul Kripke has also written ground-breaking works on the theory of truth (1975), the theory of knowledge (2011), and the semantics of fictional discourse (2013).

scholarly journals Kripke's Objections to Description Theories of Names

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-497 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael McKinsey
Keyword(s):  
Proper Names ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Naming And Necessity

In “Naming and Necessity” Saul Kripke describes some cases which, he claims, provide counterexamples both to cluster theories and, more generally, to description theories of proper names. My view of these cases is that while they do not provide counterexamples to cluster theories, they can be used to provide evidence against single-description theories. (I count as single-description theories both “short-for-descriptions” theories of the Frege-Russell sort and what I shall call below “fixed-by-attributes” theories.) In this paper I shall defend both of the claims involved in my view.

Rigid Designators and Disguised Descriptions

1980 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 111-117
Author(s):  
Monte Cook
Keyword(s):  
Proper Names ◽  
List Type ◽  
Saul Kripke ◽  
Type Number ◽  
Rigid Designators ◽  
Naming And Necessity

In “Naming and Necessity” Saul Kripke repeatedly uses modal arguments to show that proper names are not abbreviated or disguised descriptions. The arguments take the following form:(a)“The F might not have been the F” is false.(b)If N were used to mean the F, then “N might not have been the F” would be false (because of (a)).(c)But “N might not have been the F” is true.(d)Therefore, N is not used to mean the F.

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