Electoral Reform and Social Choice Theory: Piecemeal Engineering and Selective Memory

2019 ◽  
pp. 63-73
Author(s):  
Hannu Nurmi
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Electoral Reform

Precursors to Public Choice

2019 ◽  
pp. 796-816
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mathematical Skill ◽  
The Many ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.

Social choice theory

2013 ◽  
pp. 263-284
Author(s):  
Martin Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory

scholarly journals How to Judge Voting Schemes

1995 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amartya Sen
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Axiomatic Method ◽  
Voting Procedures

This symposium on voting procedures presents many interesting findings and insights. This note scrutinizes them and discusses two general issues. First, the assumption that voters’ preferences are menu-independent (and based on one canonical ordering of the alternatives) underestimates the importance of the process of voting (voting for x, against y). Second, evaluation can be a two-way process, including the axiomatic method (of social choice theory), going from isolated properties to voting schemes, and the converse method of first identifying attractions and perversities of particular voting schemes (as in this symposium) and then using properties for later axiomatic use.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document