Explaining Differences in the Renewable Energy Policy Approaches in Germany, the United States and Japan

Author(s):  
Katrin Jordan-Korte
2019 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 82-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin C. Pischke ◽  
Barry Solomon ◽  
Adam Wellstead ◽  
Alberto Acevedo ◽  
Amarella Eastmond ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Karapin

Much literature on federalism and multilevel governance argues that federalist institutional arrangements promote renewable energy policies. However, the U.S. case supports a different view that federalism has ambivalent effects. Policy innovation has occurred at the state level and to some extent has led to policy adoption by other states and the federal government, but the extent is limited by the veto power of fossil fuel interests that are rooted in many state governments and in Congress, buttressed by increasing Republican Party hostility to environmental and climate policy. This argument is supported by a detailed analysis of five periods of federal and state renewable energy policy-making, from the Carter to the Trump administrations. The negative effects of federalism on national renewable energy policy in the United States, in contrast to the West European cases in this special issue, are mainly due to the interaction of its federalist institutions with party polarization and a strong domestic fossil fuel industry.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 365-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irene Teshamulwa Okioga ◽  
Jy Wu ◽  
Yesim Sireli ◽  
Heather Hendren

2020 ◽  
pp. 153244002091886
Author(s):  
Sung Eun Kim ◽  
Johannes Urpelainen ◽  
Joonseok Yang

State policies shape firms’ incentives to lobby in the United States, but the existing lobbying literature mostly ignores these incentives. Using lobbying records for all electric utilities in the United States from 1998 to 2012, we examine how state policies affect federal lobbying by both proponents and opponents of federal support for the renewable energy policy. Our theory predicts that supportive state policies reduce the returns to lobbying by both proponents and opponents. Empirically, we show that when the federal production tax credit for renewable energy is about to expire, electric utilities from states without renewable portfolio standards become more likely to lobby than those from states with these policies. Because the timing of the expiration of the production tax credit is quasi-random, these findings carry a causal interpretation. Using text analysis techniques, we also show that the lobbying efforts are focused on energy and environmental issues while lobbying on unrelated topics remains unaffected.


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