A bargaining model of cooperative games

This article analyzes intimate partner violence (IPV) in a developing country context, namely, Turkey, which faces an enormous increase in femicide cases over the last decade. Analyzing a very rich nationwide representative survey on IPV, we show that it is not only the absolute status of women but also their relative status in terms of income and education that affects different types of domestic violence, ranging from emotional abuse to physical and sexual violence. Besides, factors related to marriage setting are found to have a significant role in the effect of women’s superior status on IPV. Overall, we provide evidence to support the relative resource theory and invalidate the intra-household bargaining model in the Turkish case.

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Weak Berge Equilibrium in Finite Three-person Games: Conception and Computation

Open Computer Science ◽

10.1515/comp-2020-0210 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 11 (1) ◽

pp. 127-134

Author(s):

Konstantin Kudryavtsev ◽

Ustav Malkov

Keyword(s):

Cooperative Games ◽

Hippocratic Oath ◽

The Other ◽

Mixed Strategies ◽

Finite Games ◽

Moral Basis ◽

Other Hand ◽

Berge Equilibrium ◽

Do No Harm ◽

Non Cooperative Games

AbstractThe paper proposes the concept of a weak Berge equilibrium. Unlike the Berge equilibrium, the moral basis of this equilibrium is the Hippocratic Oath “First do no harm”. On the other hand, any Berge equilibrium is a weak Berge equilibrium. But, there are weak Berge equilibria, which are not the Berge equilibria. The properties of the weak Berge equilibrium have been investigated. The existence of the weak Berge equilibrium in mixed strategies has been established for finite games. The weak Berge equilibria for finite three-person non-cooperative games are computed.

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The Banzhaf interaction index for bi-cooperative games

International Journal of General Systems ◽

10.1080/03081079.2021.1924166 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-15

Author(s):

Jabbar Abbas

Keyword(s):

Cooperative Games ◽

Interaction Index

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Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining

Journal of Conflict Resolution ◽

10.1177/00220027211027309 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 002200272110273

Author(s):

Aseem Mahajan ◽

Reuben Kline ◽

Dustin Tingley

Keyword(s):

Climate Change ◽

Characteristic Feature ◽

Economic Loss ◽

Bargaining Model ◽

Intergovernmental Panel ◽

Climate Negotiations ◽

Collective Risk ◽

International Climate ◽

Alternating Offers ◽

International Climate Negotiations

International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.

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