Creating space for reflection and dialogue: Examples of new modes of communication for empowering climate action

“The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again but expecting different results.” This quote by Albert Einstein highlights our need for new formats of communication to address the knowledge-action gap regarding climate change and other sustainability challenges. This includes reflection, and communication spaces, as well as methods and approaches that can catalyze the emergence of transformative change and action. In this article we present and reflect on experiments we carried out at international climate negotiations and conferences.

Simulating International Climate Negotiations in Classrooms

A simulation of the international climate negotiations was designed for more than 50 students of political science and other study programs dealing with sustainability. A key advantage of such simulations is that they are highly adaptable to groups of different sizes, academic backgrounds, or learning levels and can be used to teach a number of major concepts within the same framework.. the primary objective of such simulations is that students grasp the difficulties to achieve collective action

Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining

International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.

The Integrated Ocean Carbon Observing System

<p>The Oceans have taken up 20-25% of the carbon dioxide released to the atmosphere by human activities, in the process slowing the rate of climate change and giving us more time to adapt to and mitigate the effects of global warming. However this ‘sink’ has not been stable over the recent past and there is therefore a need to measure it in near real time with higher confidence than currently possible so that appropriate policy measures can be developed and implemented in response to any change. We have a wide array of tools including satellites, ship based and autonomous (gliders, moored, floats and surface vehicles) measuring systems which together with the associated data infrastructure can demonstrably come together to deliver this vision. These have largely been developed under short-term funding streams and, as a consequence do not currently deliver the robust, near real time, sustainable estimate of ocean C uptake that we believe is necessary to support international climate negotiations and the development of adaptation/mitigation strategies. We are currently developing a blueprint for the ‘Integrated Ocean Carbon Observing System’ which we believe will be as necessary for reliably forecasting climate over the next 5-10 years as meteorological observations currently are for forecasting weather over the next 5-10 days. In this contribution we will describe the key elements of this blueprint and outline a timeline for assembling them together to deliver an annual near realtime databased estimate of ocean carbon uptake to the annual COP in support of international climate negotiations.</p>

Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis

We have collected data from a world-wide survey among COP delegates to empirically investigate preferences for certain burden sharing rules among key groups in a setting that reflects the possibility of observing concessions from negotiating partners. In our survey, the participants had the opportunity to select and combine up to eight (pre-defined) burden sharing rules and to assign relative weights to the selected rules in their preferred bundle. We examine whether such a mechanism helps to overcome the currently strictly (self-interested) strategic claims on equity in the negotiation process. We observe that delegates from different groups of countries show a general willingness for concessions. However, the degree to which different burden sharing rules are taken into consideration partly differs between countries. As a key insight we report that the individual assessment of the polluter-pays rule based on current emissions does not only stress the persistence of the traditional Annex-B/Non-Annex-B division but also suggests tendencies for a more fragmented grouping with different positions between, for example, delegates from developing countries (i.e. G77 members) and emerging countries (i.e. BASIC). At the same time, we observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.

Market responses to global governance: International climate cooperation and Europe's carbon trading

International environmental cooperation can impose significant costs on private firms. Yet, in recent years some companies have been supportive of international climate agreements. This suggests that under certain conditions environmental accords can be profitable. In this paper, I seek to explain this puzzle by focusing on the interaction between domestic regulation and decisions at international climate negotiations. I argue that global climate cooperation hurts the profits of polluting firms if domestic governments do not shield them from international compliance costs. Vice versa, if firms are subject to protective (i.e., insufficiently severe) policy instruments at home, firms can materially gain from international climate agreements that sustain expectations about their profitability. I test the argument with an event study of the effect of decisions at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on major European firms that received free carbon permits in the early stages of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The analysis suggests that financial markets carefully follow the international climate negotiations, and reward the regulated firms based on the outcome of UNFCCC decisions. The evidence also indicates the advantageous interplay between certain types of domestic regulations and international regimes for business. More generally, the results show the perils of privately supported policy for the effectiveness of international public good provision.