Sealed Bid Auctions and Economic Market Games

1994 ◽  
pp. 3-17
Author(s):  
Gerald L. Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Economic Market ◽  
Market Games ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Sealed Bid Auctions

Bidding behavior in first price sealed bid auctions

1987 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Walker ◽  
Vernon L. Smith ◽  
James C. Cox
Keyword(s):  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Sealed Bid Auctions

Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Ejaz ◽  
Stephen Joe ◽  
Chaitanya Joshi
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Risk Analysis ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Reserve Price ◽  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Sealed Bid Auctions

In this paper, we use the adversarial risk analysis (ARA) methodology to model first-price sealed-bid auctions under quite realistic assumptions. We extend prior work to find ARA solutions for mirror equilibrium and Bayes Nash equilibrium solution concepts, not only for risk-neutral but also for risk-averse and risk-seeking bidders. We also consider bidders having different wealth and assume that the auctioned item has a reserve price.

Accounting for price dependencies in simultaneous sealed-bid auctions

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brandon A. Mayer ◽  
Eric Sodomka ◽  
Amy Greenwald ◽  
Michael Wellman
Keyword(s):  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Sealed Bid Auctions

Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christer Andersson ◽  
Ola Andersson ◽  
Tommy Andersson
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Sealed Bid Auctions

An Exploratory Study of the Introduction of Online Reverse Auctions

2003 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 96-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandy D. Jap
Keyword(s):  
Exploratory Study ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Cost Savings ◽  
Reverse Auctions ◽  
Supplier Relationships ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Sealed Bid Auctions ◽  
Online Reverse Auctions ◽  
Quasi Experiment

Buyers are increasingly turning to online reverse auctions in their negotiations with suppliers. How do these price competition mechanisms affect buyer–supplier relationships? The author considers this question in the context of a quasi experiment involving six online reverse auctions conducted in the supply base of a major industrial buyer. The results indicate that these auctions increase both new and current suppliers’ beliefs that buyers act opportunistically, particularly in open-bid auctions. Current suppliers are generally more willing than new suppliers to make dedicated investments toward the buyer. Paradoxically, in sealed-bid auctions, both current and new suppliers increase their willingness to make dedicated investments toward the buyer. Although these auctions can yield cost savings, the savings are category specific and are not systematically related to an open- or sealed-bid format. The author also discusses implications for the use of online reverse auctions in industrial sourcing activities.

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