Symmetric Stochastic Games of Resource Extraction: The Existence of Non-Randomized Stationary Equilibrium

Author(s):  
Mukul Majumdar ◽  
Rangarajan Sundaram
2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 889-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jérôme Renault ◽  
Bruno Ziliotto

We study the limit of equilibrium payoffs, as the discount factor goes to one, in non-zero-sum stochastic games. We first show that the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs always converges. We then provide two-player examples in which the whole set of equilibrium payoffs diverges. The construction is robust to perturbations of the payoffs and to the introduction of normal-form correlation.


Automatica ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 310-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Jaśkiewicz ◽  
Andrzej S. Nowak

Top ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Jaśkiewicz ◽  
Andrzej S. Nowak

2015 ◽  
Vol 112 (45) ◽  
pp. 13743-13746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eilon Solan ◽  
Nicolas Vieille

In 1953, Lloyd Shapley contributed his paper “Stochastic games” to PNAS. In this paper, he defined the model of stochastic games, which were the first general dynamic model of a game to be defined, and proved that it admits a stationary equilibrium. In this Perspective, we summarize the historical context and the impact of Shapley’s contribution.


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