scholarly journals Existence of Nash equilibria in stochastic games of resource extraction with risk-sensitive players

Top ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 502-518
Author(s):  
Hubert Asienkiewicz ◽  
Łukasz Balbus
2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (01) ◽  
pp. 25-35
Author(s):  
ŁUKASZ BALBUS ◽  
ANDRZEJ S. NOWAK

A class of nonzero-sum symmetric stochastic games of capital accumulation/resource extraction is considered. It is shown that Nash equilibria in the games with some natural constraints are also equilibrium solutions in unconstrained games and dominate in the Pareto sense an equilibrium leading to exhausting the entire resource stock in the first period of the game.


Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 230
Author(s):  
Elena Parilina ◽  
Stepan Akimochkin

In stochastic games, the player’s payoff is a stochastic variable. In most papers, expected payoff is considered as a payoff, which means the risk neutrality of the players. However, there may exist risk-sensitive players who would take into account “risk” measuring their stochastic payoffs. In the paper, we propose a model of stochastic games with mean-variance payoff functions, which is the sum of expectation and standard deviation multiplied by a coefficient characterizing a player’s attention to risk. We construct a cooperative version of a stochastic game with mean-variance preferences by defining characteristic function using a maxmin approach. The imputation in a cooperative stochastic game with mean-variance preferences is supposed to be a random vector. We construct the core of a cooperative stochastic game with mean-variance preferences. The paper extends existing models of discrete-time stochastic games and approaches to find cooperative solutions in these games.


Author(s):  
Krishnendu Chatterjee ◽  
Rupak Majumdar ◽  
Marcin Jurdziński

1999 ◽  
Vol 01 (02) ◽  
pp. 149-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
VICTOR DOMANSKY

Controlled by several agents, multistage processes of resource allocation between production and consumption with random production functions are considered as non-cooperative dynamic stochastic games. For these games, the Nash Equilibria are constructed satisfying the criteria of maximisation of some kind of "public utility". Both finite and infinite horizons of planning are examined.


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