Does Moral Responsibility Presuppose Alternate Possibilities?

2000 ◽  
pp. 89-101
Author(s):  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

scholarly journals For whom does determinism undermine moral responsibility? Surveying the conditions for free will across cultures

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivar Hannikainen ◽  
Edouard Machery ◽  
David Rose ◽  
Paulo Sousa ◽  
Florian Cova ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Ultimate Source ◽  
And Control ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions.

scholarly journals Investigation of Frankfurt's Argument on Moral Responsibility

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Tavakkol Koohi Giglou ◽  
Javad Danesh ◽  
Habib Asadi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Famous Paper ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

The common thought of Christian and Moslem philosophers considers moral responsibility of a person as dependent on his or her ability to choose from several options. However, Harry Frankfurt in his famous paper " alternate possibilities and moral responsibility" challenges freedom condition for moral responsibility with implicit reasons and makes use of several examples to show that it is completely possible for a person to be considered as morally responsible despite failure to access any kind of alternate possible. However, there are two reasons presented by Frankfurt that contrary to his claims show that presence of alternate possibilities or at least imagination for presence of alternatives is the base for responsibility or difficulty of moralactor and if sometimes anactor is regarded as responsible despite absence of alternate possible, this is resulted from his or her "ignorance" of the matter and also the impact of his "intention" in doing action. One of the main defects of theories which deal with moral responsibility conditions is ignoring the intention and purpose of moralactor. This is while ethics domain includes internal actions like intention and will of moral actor as well as apparent actions.

Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation

2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 385-410
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Principle Of Alternate Possibilities ◽  
The Many ◽  
Alternate Possibilities ◽  
Skeptical Conclusion

Take determinism to be the thesis that for any instant, there is exactly one physically possible future (van Inwagen 1983, 3), and understand incompatibilism regarding responsibility to be the view that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility. Of the many different arguments that have been advanced for this view, the crux of a relatively traditional one is this: If determinism is true, then we lack alternatives. If we lack alternatives, then we can't be morally responsible for any of our behavior. Therefore, if determinism is true, then we can't be morally responsible for any of our behavior. The second premise is a version of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP): persons are morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise. This principle, in conjunction with the assumptions that responsibility requires control, and that this control consists in the freedom to do otherwise, provides the vital bridge from the initial premise to the skeptical conclusion. Some incompatibilists, joining ranks with various compatibilists, have sought to reject this principle by invoking so-called ‘Frankfurt examples.’

Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination

2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Funkhouser
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Frankfurt Cases ◽  
Principle Of Alternate Possibilities ◽  
Causal Preemption ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

For nearly forty years now, Frankfurt cases have served as one of the major contributors to the compatibilist's cause with respect to moral responsibility. These cases typically involve a causally preempted condition that is supposed to guarantee a choice without causing it. This has had the effect of softening up some to the idea that determinism does not exclude moral responsibility simply in virtue of guaranteeing a unique future. I believe that these traditional Frankfurt cases adequately support this cause. But I also believe that the traditional versions of Frankfurt cases suffer from some rhetorical defects.My strategy is as follows. First, I want to respond to a dilemma that has been raised by some libertarians against arguments utilizing Frankfurt cases. This dilemma has the effect of raising a question-begging charge against such arguments. Part of my response is to draw attention to the relevant principle that I think Frankfurt cases should really target, a principle slightly different from Harry Frankfurt's original Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Second, I elaborate and defend the claim that traditional Frankfurt cases involve causal preemption.

scholarly journals UMA RESPOSTA INCOMPATIBILISTA AO PROBLEMA DO DETERMINISMO E DA RESPONSABILIDADE MORAL

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (28) ◽  
pp. 242-262
Author(s):  
Patricia FACHIN (Unisinos)
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Peter Van Inwagen ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

Tradicionalmente, a atribuição da responsabilidade moral depende de um compromisso com a existência do livre arbítrio, entendido de maneira bastante geral como “poder agir de outro modo”. No entanto, desde a publicação de Alternate Possibilities e Moral Responsibility por Harry G. Frankfurt em 1969, tal tese tem sido questionada e alguns filósofos argumentam que é possível atribuir responsabilidade moral mesmo se o determinismo for verdadeiro. A fim de responder a essa tentativa de conciliar a responsabilidade moral com o determinismo, Peter van Inwagen argumenta que o Princípio da Prevenção Possível - PPP demonstra que a existência da responsabilidade moral depende de um compromisso com uma tese metafísica do livre arbítrio. Assim, este artigo tem dois objetivos: por um lado, expor as posições compatibilistas e incompatibilistas sobre responsabilidade moral e determinismo defendidas por Frankfurt e van Inwagen e, por outro lado, apresentar a razão pela qual o não compromisso com uma noção metafísica de o livre arbítrio cria um problema ético. Assim, o artigo será dividido em quatro partes: na primeira parte, farei uma breve reconstrução do problema do compatibilismo entre livre-arbítrio e determinismo, do qual o problema da compatibilidade entre responsabilidade moral e determinismo é um subproblema; na segunda, apresentarei o argumento de Frankfurt, que deu origem à compatibilidade entre responsabilidade moral e determinismo; na terceira, vou expor o Princípio da Prevenção Possível - PPP formulado por Peter van Inwagen, como uma resposta incompatível à tese de Frankfurt; e, finalmente, justificarei porque o não compromisso com uma tese metafísica do livre-arbítrio tem implicações éticas.

Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities

2000 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kadri Vihvelin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Common Assumption ◽  
Four Quartets ◽  
Principle Of Alternate Possibilities ◽  
Famous Paper ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

For us there is only the trying. The rest is not our business.T.S. Eliot, Four QuartetsFew arguments in contemporary philosophy have had more influence than Harry Frankfurt's ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsiblity.’ In that famous paper Frankfurt noted that all parties to the traditional debate about the compatibility of free will and moral responsibility with determinism had subscribed to a common assumption. They had assumed the truth of something Frankfurt called ‘the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,’ which he expressed as follows:(PAP) A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.In the traditional debate incompatibilists argued that if determinism is true, then no one can ever do otherwise, while compatibilists argued that there is a morally relevant sense in which even a deterministic agent can do otherwise. Frankfurt proposed to show that PAPis false, thereby undercutting the traditional debate.

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