Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities

2000 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kadri Vihvelin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Common Assumption ◽  
Four Quartets ◽  
Principle Of Alternate Possibilities ◽  
Famous Paper ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

For us there is only the trying. The rest is not our business.T.S. Eliot, Four QuartetsFew arguments in contemporary philosophy have had more influence than Harry Frankfurt's ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsiblity.’ In that famous paper Frankfurt noted that all parties to the traditional debate about the compatibility of free will and moral responsibility with determinism had subscribed to a common assumption. They had assumed the truth of something Frankfurt called ‘the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,’ which he expressed as follows:(PAP) A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.In the traditional debate incompatibilists argued that if determinism is true, then no one can ever do otherwise, while compatibilists argued that there is a morally relevant sense in which even a deterministic agent can do otherwise. Frankfurt proposed to show that PAPis false, thereby undercutting the traditional debate.

scholarly journals Is regulative control a necessary condition for moral responsibility?

2014 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-62
Author(s):  
Marko Peric
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Sufficient Cause ◽  
Principle Of Alternate Possibilities ◽  
Regulative Control ◽  
The Given ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

Libertarianist concept of free will is based on the principle of alternate possibilities - standpoint which presupposes that an agent has moral responsibility only if, in the given circumstances, he could have done otherwise. The author of this paper tries to review this key principle of libertarianism, and to determine whether the access to alternate possibilities represents necessary or sufficient cause for the assessment of moral responsibility, or neither of that. Finally, based on the consideration of famous Frankfurt?s and Austin-style examples, in this paper is defended a sort of compatibilism, and the main advantages of that kind of free will concept over libertarianism are emphasized.

scholarly journals For whom does determinism undermine moral responsibility? Surveying the conditions for free will across cultures

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivar Hannikainen ◽  
Edouard Machery ◽  
David Rose ◽  
Paulo Sousa ◽  
Florian Cova ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Ultimate Source ◽  
And Control ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions.

scholarly journals Investigation of Frankfurt's Argument on Moral Responsibility

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Tavakkol Koohi Giglou ◽  
Javad Danesh ◽  
Habib Asadi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Famous Paper ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

The common thought of Christian and Moslem philosophers considers moral responsibility of a person as dependent on his or her ability to choose from several options. However, Harry Frankfurt in his famous paper " alternate possibilities and moral responsibility" challenges freedom condition for moral responsibility with implicit reasons and makes use of several examples to show that it is completely possible for a person to be considered as morally responsible despite failure to access any kind of alternate possible. However, there are two reasons presented by Frankfurt that contrary to his claims show that presence of alternate possibilities or at least imagination for presence of alternatives is the base for responsibility or difficulty of moralactor and if sometimes anactor is regarded as responsible despite absence of alternate possible, this is resulted from his or her "ignorance" of the matter and also the impact of his "intention" in doing action. One of the main defects of theories which deal with moral responsibility conditions is ignoring the intention and purpose of moralactor. This is while ethics domain includes internal actions like intention and will of moral actor as well as apparent actions.

Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation

2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 385-410
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Principle Of Alternate Possibilities ◽  
The Many ◽  
Alternate Possibilities ◽  
Skeptical Conclusion

Take determinism to be the thesis that for any instant, there is exactly one physically possible future (van Inwagen 1983, 3), and understand incompatibilism regarding responsibility to be the view that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility. Of the many different arguments that have been advanced for this view, the crux of a relatively traditional one is this: If determinism is true, then we lack alternatives. If we lack alternatives, then we can't be morally responsible for any of our behavior. Therefore, if determinism is true, then we can't be morally responsible for any of our behavior. The second premise is a version of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP): persons are morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise. This principle, in conjunction with the assumptions that responsibility requires control, and that this control consists in the freedom to do otherwise, provides the vital bridge from the initial premise to the skeptical conclusion. Some incompatibilists, joining ranks with various compatibilists, have sought to reject this principle by invoking so-called ‘Frankfurt examples.’

Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination

2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Funkhouser
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Frankfurt Cases ◽  
Principle Of Alternate Possibilities ◽  
Causal Preemption ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

For nearly forty years now, Frankfurt cases have served as one of the major contributors to the compatibilist's cause with respect to moral responsibility. These cases typically involve a causally preempted condition that is supposed to guarantee a choice without causing it. This has had the effect of softening up some to the idea that determinism does not exclude moral responsibility simply in virtue of guaranteeing a unique future. I believe that these traditional Frankfurt cases adequately support this cause. But I also believe that the traditional versions of Frankfurt cases suffer from some rhetorical defects.My strategy is as follows. First, I want to respond to a dilemma that has been raised by some libertarians against arguments utilizing Frankfurt cases. This dilemma has the effect of raising a question-begging charge against such arguments. Part of my response is to draw attention to the relevant principle that I think Frankfurt cases should really target, a principle slightly different from Harry Frankfurt's original Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Second, I elaborate and defend the claim that traditional Frankfurt cases involve causal preemption.

scholarly journals Shaky Ground

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Simkulet
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Shaky Ground

The debate surrounding free will and moral responsibility is one of the most intransigent debates in contemporary philosophy - but it does not have to be. At its heart, the free will debate is a metaethical debate - a debate about the meaning of certain moral terms - free will, moral responsibility, blameworthiness, praiseworthiness. Compatibilists argue that these concepts are compatible with wholly deterministic world, while incompatibilists argue that these concepts require indeterminism, or multiple possible futures. However, compatibilists and incompatibilists do not disagree on everything - both parties agree that free will and moral responsibility require control - the kind of control that we believe we have over the majority of our everyday actions. Over the course of any given day each of us makes countless choices, and in most situations as we make these choices we cannot help but believe that we are in control of them - that our actions are free and we are morally responsible for them. Here I argue that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility are inexorably tied to this experience of apparent liberty.

Nietzsche’s Theory of Agency

2019 ◽  
pp. 115-146
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Derk Pereboom ◽  
Gary Watson ◽  
The Will ◽  
And Control ◽  
Galen Strawson ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

Nietzsche’s repudiation of free will and moral responsibility is documented throughout his corpus, and his arguments for this conclusion—arguments from his distinctive kind of fatalism, his skepticism about the causal efficacy of the will, and his particular brand of epiphenomenalism about the conscious mental states crucial to deliberation—are shown to undermine both compatibilist and incompatibilist views about free will and moral responsibility by engaging the views of many contemporary philosophers working on these topics, including Harry Frankfurt, Galen Strawson, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, Gary Watson, and others. In particular, the chapter argues that both “alternate possibilities” and “control” views of free will are vulnerable to Nietzsche’s critique. Some empirical evidence is adduced in support of Nietzsche’s view.

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