scholarly journals Systemic Risk: Fire-Walling Financial Systems Using Network-Based Approaches

Author(s):  
V. Sasidevan ◽  
Nils Bertschinger
2001 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 236-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Eisenberg ◽  
Thomas H. Noe

2006 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 148
Author(s):  
Richard N. Cooper ◽  
Kern Alexander ◽  
Rahul Dhumale ◽  
John Eatwell

Author(s):  
Rickard Nyman ◽  
Sujit Kapadia ◽  
David Tuckett ◽  
David Gregory ◽  
Paul Ormerod ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 195-209
Author(s):  
John Berdell ◽  
Thomas Mondschean

At nearly the same moment, Jeremy Bentham and Henry Thornton adopted diametrically opposed approaches to stabilizing the financial system. Henry Thornton eloquently defended the Bank of England’s actions as the lender of last resort and saw its discretionary management of liquidity as the key stabilizer of the credit system. In contrast, Jeremy Bentham advocated the imposition of strict bank regulations and examinations, without which, he predicted, Britain would soon experience a systemic crisis—which he called “universal bankruptcy.” There are strong parallels but also dramatic differences with our recent attempts to reduce systemic risk within financial systems. The Basel III bank regulatory framework effectively intertwines Bentham’s and Thornton’s diametrically opposed approaches to stabilizing banks. Yet Bentham’s and Thornton’s concerns regarding the stability of the wider financial system remain alive today due to financial innovation and the politics of responding to financial crises.


e-Finanse ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 59-68
Author(s):  
Tomasz Zieliński

Abstract Systemic risk is a fundamental constituent of contemporary financial systems. For the past decades a growing number of abrupt upsets in financial systems could be observed. Due to previous experiences, politicians and regulators prefer to identify the offenders outside the system or to blame one of the entities inside the system. However, nowadays many disasters in anthropogenic systems cannot be perceived that way. They are often results of inappropriate interactions rather than external or internal impulses. This requires a paradigm shift in thinking about systemic risk. A component-oriented perspective should be nowadays replaced with a network-oriented view. Closer insight into the concept of systemic risk can refer to the model of the system composed of a huge number of interconnected components. In such a system, systemic risk is usually considered to have a ‘cascading’, ‘domino’ or ‘contagion’ effect, resulting from strong connections. An initial failure could have disastrous effects and cause extreme damage as the number of network nodes goes to infinity. Strongly interconnected, complex dynamic systems cannot be understood by the simple sum of their components’ properties, in contrast to loosely coupled systems. What makes the behaviour of complex financial systems particularly unpredictable is that systemic failures may occur even if everybody involved is highly skilled, highly motivated and behaving properly.


2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 156-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prasanna Gai ◽  
Nigel Jenkinson ◽  
Sujit Kapadia

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document