lender of last resort
Recently Published Documents


TOTAL DOCUMENTS

408
(FIVE YEARS 77)

H-INDEX

22
(FIVE YEARS 2)

Moral Hazard ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 80-104
Author(s):  
Juan Flores Zendejas ◽  
Norbert Gaillard

Healthcare ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (10) ◽  
pp. 1362
Author(s):  
Gaofeng Yin ◽  
Hanning Song ◽  
Jian Wang ◽  
Stephen Nicholas ◽  
Elizabeth Maitland

The COVID-19 run on medical resources crashed Wuhan’s medical care system, a medical disaster duplicated in many countries facing the COVID-19 pandemic. In a novel approach to understanding the run on Wuhan’s medical resources, we draw from bank run theory to analyze the causes and consequences of the COVID-19 run on Wuhan’s medical resources and recommend policy changes and government actions to attenuate runs on medical resources in the future. Like bank runs, the cause of the COVID-19 medical resource run was rooted in China’s local medical resource context and a sudden realignment of expectations, reflecting shortages and misallocations of hospital resources (inadequate liquidity and portfolio composition); high level hospitals siphoning-off patients from lower level health providers (bank moral hazard and adverse selection problem); patients selecting high-level hospitals over lower-level health care (depositor moral hazard problem); inadequate government oversight and uncontrolled risky hospital behavior (inadequate bank regulatory control); biased medical insurance schemes (inadequate depositor insurance); and failure to provide medical resource reserves (failure as lender of last resort). From Wuhan’s COVID-19 run on medical resources, we recommend that control and reform by government enlarge medical resource supply, improve the capacity of primary medical care, ensure timely virus information, formulate principles for the allocation of medical resources that suit a country’s national conditions, optimize the medical insurance schemes and public health fund allocations and enhance the emergency support of medical resources.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 156-160
Author(s):  
I Komang Arya Wisnu Amerta ◽  
Ni Komang Arini Satyawati ◽  
Desak Gde Dwi Arini

Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk mendeskripsikan Bagaimanakah fungsi pengawasan Bank oleh OJK dalam penyaluran kredit bagi Badan Usaha Milik Swasta, Bagaimanakah tindak lanjut pengawasan bank oleh Otoritas Jasa Keuangan dalam penyaluran kredit bagi Badan Usaha Milik Swasta? Penelitian dilakukan secara hukum normatif. Sumber bahan hukum primer dari peraturan perundang- undangan  yang  berlaku seperti  UU Nomor  21  /  2011.  Sumber  bahan hukum sekunder dari literatur. Analisis penelitian dilakukan secara kualitatif dan hasilnya disajikan secara deskriptif. Hasil penelitian bahwa fungsi pengawasan bank oleh OJK dalam penyaluran kredit bagi Badan Usaha Milik Swasta (BUMS) sesuai Pasal 6 UU Nomor 21/2011 bahwa pengawasan Bank dilakukan untuk mendorong bank agar melaksanakan secara konsisten ketentuan perbankan dan mengacu pada prinsip kehati-hatian. Tindak lanjut pengawasan OJK dalam penyaluran kredit bagi BUMS bila terjadi kesulitan atau kredit macet maka OJK bekerja sama dengan Bank Indonesia sebagai Lender of Last Resort untuk mengatasi permasalahan kesulitan bank tersebut guna menjaga stabilitas perbankan serta menjamin keamanan keuangan nasabah selaku konsumen.  


2021 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 223-233
Author(s):  
Arne Hansen ◽  
Dirk Meyer

AbstractThe coronavirus crisis has led to a sharp increase in the debt-to-GDP ratios of the euro area member states. Without external support, access to the capital market could be seriously threatened in the medium term for Italy, but also for other member states. While the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme, which is designed as a monetary policy instrument, is regarded by some as a violation of the prohibition of monetary financing, the Next Generation EU recovery fund is likely to direct the fundamental structures of the European Union towards a fiscal union with considerable redistribution elements. This article analyses an alternative strategy, namely debt relief by the European System of Central Banks through an EU debt agency. Such a scheme would be possible without amending the EU treaties and would avoid negative equity at the central banks. The question is under what circumstances would this approach be suitable and proportionate?


Author(s):  
David Quinn

Authority of the European Central Bank (the Bank) over its operational norms in the eyes of market actors – Exogenous and endogenous authority and legitimacy – The reconciliation by the Bank and the Court of Justice of the EU (the Court) of the pre-existing norm and political-economic reality with Article 123 TFEU – Sovereign lender of last resort – Eurozone Crisis – Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) – Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) – Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP)


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 6-18
Author(s):  
M. Zharikov

This article is devoted to a central bank’s response to a financial crisis based on a case study of the US Federal Reserve’s handling of the financial crisis in 2008–2010. This article will also be focusing on the intense phase of the financial crisis. It is focusing primarily on the lender of last resort function of a central bank. The article concludes with the most significant issues about the aftermath and the recovery, as well as lessons to deal with financial failure during the coronavirus and its aftermath.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document