An Economic Analysis of Regional Conflict, Secession, and Bargaining Power Under Uneven Resource Distribution

Author(s):  
Tohru Naito
2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Suyog Ravindra Dandekar ◽  
Angara V. Raja

AbstractThe paper provides a behavioral approach to analysis of pre-trial negotiations. This paper differs from earlier studies in that the most likely outcome forms the basis on which the parties assess their benefits and costs. This is based not on precise calculations of expected values, but on the expectations of the parties which depend on assessment of relative strengths of their case. This is modelled as an outcome of an imperfect cognitive process which is characterized by coherence based reasoning and insensitivities to actual probabilities, and legal discovery. Furthermore, the paper identifies factors which affect bargaining power and how bargaining power affects settlement amounts.


1981 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 199-200
Author(s):  
Frederick Mulhauser
Keyword(s):  

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