Equilibrium existence results for simple dynamic games

1974 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 613-631 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. R. Kleindorfer ◽  
M. R. Sertel
2009 ◽  
Vol 2009 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monica Patriche

We define the model of an abstract economy with differential (asymmetric) information and a measure space of agents. We generalize N. C. Yannelis's result (2007), considering that each agent is characterised by a random preference correspondence instead of having a random utility function. We establish two different equilibrium existence results.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 979-994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Senda Ounaies ◽  
Jean-Marc Bonnisseau ◽  
Souhail Chebbi

Abstract In this paper, we consider a production economy with an unbounded attainable set where the consumers may have non-complete non-transitive preferences. To get the existence of an equilibrium, we provide an asymptotic property on preferences for the attainable consumptions and we use a combination of the nonlinear optimization and fixed point theorems on truncated economies together with an asymptotic argument. We show that this condition holds true if the set of attainable allocations is compact or, when the preferences are representable by utility functions, if the set of attainable individually rational utility levels is compact. This assumption generalizes the CPP condition of [N. Allouch, An equilibrium existence result with short selling, J. Math. Econom. 37 2002, 2, 81–94] and covers the example of [F. H. Page, Jr., M. H. Wooders and P. K. Monteiro, Inconsequential arbitrage, J. Math. Econom. 34 2000, 4, 439–469] when the attainable utility levels set is not compact. So we extend the previous existence results with non-compact attainable sets in two ways by adding a production sector and considering general preferences.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 1221-1248
Author(s):  
Paulo Barelli ◽  
John Duggan

Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE payoffs: any SPE obtained using public randomization can be “decorrelated” to produce a payoff‐equivalent SPE of the original game. As a corollary, we provide an alternative route to a result of He and Sun (2020) on existence of SPE without public randomization, which in turn yields equilibrium existence for stochastic games with weakly continuous state transitions.


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