Art. XV.—Essay on personal identity, and its proof from physical signs

This chapter examines the difference between John Locke's definition of a person [P], considered as a kind of thing, and his definition of a subject of experience of a certain sophisticated sort [S]. It first discusses the equation [P] = [S], where [S] is assumed to be a continuing thing that is able to survive radical change of substantial realization, as well as Locke's position about consciousness in relation to [P]'s identity or existence over time as [S]. It argues that Locke is not guilty of circularity because he is not proposing consciousness as the determinant of [S]'s identity over time, but only of [S]'s moral and legal responsibility over time. Finally, it suggests that the terms “Person” and “Personal identity” pull apart, in Locke's scheme of things, but in a perfectly coherent way.

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A Fatal Error of Locke’s?

10.23943/princeton/9780691161006.003.0016 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Galen Strawson

Keyword(s):

Personal Identity ◽

John Locke ◽

A Priori ◽

Point Of View ◽

Radical Theory ◽

Single Person

This chapter argues that the unqualified attribution of the radical theory to John Locke is mistaken if we are to take into account the fact that the theory allows for freaks like [Sₓ]. It first considers [I]-transfer without [P]-transfer—that is, [I]-transfer preserving personal identity—before discussing Locke's response to the idea that personal identity might survive [I]-transfer from an a priori point of view. It suggests that [I]-transfer is possible in such a way that the existence of a single Person [P₁] from t₁ to t₂ can successively (and non-overlappingly) involve the existence of two immaterial substances. It also explains how Locke's claim that [I]-transfer is possible opens up the possibility that it could go wrong, in such a way as to lead to injustice. Finally, it examines Locke's notion of “sensible creature,” which refers to a subject of experience who is a person.

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