The time consistency of the optimality principles in non-zero sum differential games

Author(s):  
L. A. Petrosjan
2011 ◽  
Vol 153 (3) ◽  
pp. 662-687 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beatris Escobedo-Trujillo ◽  
Daniel López-Barrientos ◽  
Onésimo Hernández-Lerma

2003 ◽  
Vol 119 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Jørgensen ◽  
G. Martín-Herrán ◽  
G. Zaccour

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. CARDALIAGUET ◽  
M. QUINCAMPOIX

We study a zero-sum differential game where the players have only an unperfect information on the state of the system. In the beginning of the game only a random distribution on the initial state is available. The main result of the paper is the existence of the value obtained through an uniqueness result for Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations stated on the space of measure in ℝn. This result is the first step for future work on differential games with lack of information.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 93-111
Author(s):  
Анна Тур ◽  
Anna Tur ◽  
Леон Аганесович Петросян ◽  
Leon Petrosyan

The paper describes a class of differential games on networks. The construction of cooperative optimality principles using a special type of characteristic function that takes into account the network structure of the game is investigated. The core, the Shapley value and the tau-value are used as cooperative optimality principles. The results are demonstrated on a model of a differential research investment game, where the Shapley value and the tau-value are explicitly constructed.


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