An authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol secure against active attacks

1998 ◽  
pp. 135-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shouichi Hirose ◽  
Susumu Yoshida
Keyword(s):  
Key Agreement ◽  
Key Agreement Protocol ◽  
Diffie Hellman ◽  
Active Attacks

Key Management

2011 ◽  
pp. 88-113
Author(s):  
Chuan-Kun Wu
Keyword(s):  
Secret Sharing ◽  
Key Management ◽  
Key Agreement ◽  
Public Key ◽  
Key Escrow ◽  
The Public ◽  
Cryptographic Algorithm ◽  
Diffie Hellman ◽  
Public Networks ◽  
Active Attacks

In secure communications, key management is not as simple as metal key management which is supposed to be in a key ring or simply put in a pocket. Suppose Alice wants to transmit some confidential information to Bob over the public networks such as the Internet, Alice could simply encrypt the message using a known cipher such as AES, and then transmit the ciphertext to Bob. However, in order to enable Bob to decrypt the ciphertext to get the original message, in traditional cipher system, Bob needs to have the encryption key. How to let Alice securely and efficiently transmit the encryption key to Bob is a problem of key management. An intuitive approach would be to use a secure channel for the key transmission; this worked in earlier years, but is not a desirable solution in today’s electronic world. Since the invention of public key cryptography, the key management problem with respect to secret key transmission has been solved, which can either employ the Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme or to use a public key cryptographic algorithm to encrypt the encryption key (which is often known as a session key). This approach is secure against passive attacks, but is vulnerable against active attacks (more precisely the man-in-the-middle attacks). So there must be a way to authenticate the identity of the communication entities. This leads to public key management where the public key infrastructure (PKI) is a typical set of practical protocols, and there is also a set of international standards about PKI. With respect to private key management, it is to prevent keys to be lost or stolen. To prevent a key from being lost, one way is to use the secret sharing, and another is to use the key escrow technique. Both aspects have many research outcomes and practical solutions. With respect to keys being stolen, another practical solution is to use a password to encrypt the key. Hence, there are many password-based security protocols in different applications. This chapter presents a comprehensive description about how each aspect of the key management works. Topics on key management covered by this chapter include key agreement, group-based key agreement and key distribution, the PKI mechanisms, secret sharing, key escrow, password associated key management, and key management in PGP and UMTS systems.

scholarly journals Cryptanalysis and improvement of an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol

2008 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengbao Wang ◽  
Zhenfu Cao ◽  
M.A. Strangio ◽  
Lihua Wang
Keyword(s):  
Elliptic Curve ◽  
Key Agreement ◽  
Key Agreement Protocol ◽  
Diffie Hellman

scholarly journals A Lightweight Key Agreement Protocol Based on Chinese Remainder Theorem and ECDH for Smart Homes

Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 1357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Jiang ◽  
Yong Shen ◽  
Qingyi Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Smart Home ◽  
Key Agreement ◽  
Chinese Remainder Theorem ◽  
Mutual Authentication ◽  
Security Analysis ◽  
Sensor Nodes ◽  
Replay Attack ◽  
Key Agreement Protocol ◽  
Diffie Hellman ◽  
Home Systems

Security and efficiency are the two main challenges for designing a smart home system. In this paper, by incorporating Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) into the elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH), a lightweight key agreement protocol for smart home systems is constructed. Firstly, one-way hash authentication is used to identify the sensor nodes instead of mutual authentication to reduce the authentication cost. Secondly, the CRT is introduced to enhance the security of the original ECDH key agreement. Security analysis showed that the proposed protocol can validate the data integrity and resist the replay attack, the man-in-middle attack, and other attacks. Performance analysis and experiments showed that the protocol achieves high security with low communication and computation costs, and can be implemented in smart home systems.

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