Import competition and quality upgrading revisited: the role of overall protection

Author(s):  
Zhaohui Niu ◽  
Saileshsingh Gunessee ◽  
Chris Milner
2013 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 476-490 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Amiti ◽  
Amit K. Khandelwal

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaomin Cui ◽  
Miaojie Yu ◽  
Rui Zhang

Abstract We study how the contracting environment affects the quality of trade. A better contracting environment not only induces specialisations in industries intensively using customised inputs, but also causes quality upgrading of domestic varieties and tougher competition in these industries. We incorporate these effects into a Ricardian model with customised input and product quality. Our model predicts that better judicial quality raises a country’s import prices and quality more in contract-intensive products, but has no impacts on its export prices or quality. We empirically confirm these predictions, and find that rising judicial quality is associated with increasing specialisations in contract-intensive industries.


Author(s):  
Gideon Ndubuisi ◽  
Solomon Owusu

AbstractInformal contracting institutions constitute an essential part of a country’s overall contracting institution, however, the nascent literature examining the effect of contracting institutions on the quality of products a country produces and exports, have paid a limited attention on the role of informal contracting institutions. We fill this gap in the literature by examining whether higher trust levels, as an informal contracting institution, leads to product-quality upgrading by reducing contractual frictions and opportunistic behaviors. Using industry-level data spanning 1995–2014, we examined this relationship using the generalized difference-in-difference method. We find that contract-intensive industries in trust-intensive societies experience a disproportionally higher increase in the production and export of higher-quality products compared to those industries in low-trusting societies. This result holds after controlling for conventional sources of comparative advantage and formal contracting institution. Hence, the result underscores the importance of informal contracting institutions for improved economic performance and stress the crucial fact that countries with strong and efficient informal institutions can still benefit in market-related activities even in the presence of weak formal institutions.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavel Chakraborty ◽  
Rahul Singh ◽  
Vidhya Soundararajan

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Amiti ◽  
Amit Khandelwal

JAMA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 195 (12) ◽  
pp. 1005-1009 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. J. Fernbach
Keyword(s):  

JAMA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 195 (3) ◽  
pp. 167-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. E. Van Metre

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