Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games
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AbstractOriginating from Kamenica and Gentzkow (Am Econ Rev 101(6):2590–2615, 2011), we analyze multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion games with heterogeneous beliefs without strategic interactions among receivers, which we call unlinked. We show that given the receivers’ best-responses, the sender’s rationalizable strategies are obtained from a single linear programming problem.
2020 ◽
pp. 235-259
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2017 ◽
Vol 27
(3)
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pp. 563-573
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1995 ◽
Vol 6
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pp. 31-38
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1996 ◽
Vol 82
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pp. 57-64
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1987 ◽
Vol 30
(4)
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pp. 449-471
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