scholarly journals A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

Author(s):  
V. Bhaskar ◽  
George J. Mailath ◽  
Stephen Edward Morris
2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 945-951 ◽  
Author(s):  
János Flesch ◽  
Jeroen Kuipers ◽  
Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi ◽  
Gijs Schoenmakers ◽  
Eran Shmaya ◽  
...  

2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Demichelis ◽  
Klaus Ritzberger ◽  
Jeroen M. Swinkels

2004 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thorsten Clausing

A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” condition is formulated in terms of revised rather than initial beliefs. Alternative notions of rationality as well as the use of knowledge instead of belief are also studied within this framework.


2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 427-433
Author(s):  
P. Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Arkadi Predtetchinski

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