The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods

2010 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 463-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Onur Kesten ◽  
Ayşe Yazıcı
Keyword(s):  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Indivisible Goods ◽  
Strategy Proof

scholarly journals When neither team wants to win: A flaw of recent UEFA qualification rules

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 526-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
László Csató
Keyword(s):  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Football Match ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Incentive Incompatibility ◽  
Dropping Points

Tanking, the act of deliberately dropping points or losing a game in order to gain some other advantage, is usually seen as being against the spirit of sports. It can be even more serious if playing a draw is a (weakly) dominant strategy for both teams in a match, since this may lead to collusion. We show that such a situation occurred in a particular football match. As our generalisation reveals, the root of the problem resides in the incentive incompatibility of certain UEFA qualification rules. The governing bodies of major sports should choose strategy-proof tournament designs because of several reasons. First, they may lead to the elimination of a third, innocent team. Second, incentive incompatible rules may discourage both teams from scoring goals, and the players could be interested in improving other match statistics than the number of goals.

scholarly journals Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (11) ◽  
pp. 3257-3287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengwu Li
Keyword(s):  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Choice Rule ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Dominant Strategies ◽  
Behavioral Interpretation ◽  
Information Set ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Better Than

A strategy is obviously dominant if, for any deviation, at any information set where both strategies first diverge, the best outcome under the deviation is no better than the worst outcome under the dominant strategy. A mechanism is obviously strategy-proof (OSP) if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies. This has a behavioral interpretation: a strategy is obviously dominant if and only if a cognitively limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant. It also has a classical interpretation: a choice rule is OSP-implementable if and only if it can be carried out by a social planner under a particular regime of partial commitment. (JEL D11, D44, D82)

Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money

2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars-Gunnar Svensson ◽  
Bo Larsson
Keyword(s):  
Indivisible Goods ◽  
Strategy Proof

scholarly journals Strategy-Proof Compromises

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Postl
Keyword(s):  
Decision Rules ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Strategy Implementation ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Dominant Strategy Implementation

We study strategy-proof decision rules in the variant of the canonical public good model proposed by Borgers and Postl (2009). In this setup, we fully characterize the set of budget-balanced strategy-proof deterministic mechanisms, which are simple threshold rules. For smooth probabilistic mechanisms, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementation. When allowing for discontinuities in the mechanism, our necessary condition remains valid, but additional conditions must hold for sufficiency. We also show that, among ex post efficient decision rules, only dictatorial ones are strategy-proof. While familiar in spirit, this result is not the consequence of any known result in the literature.

Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods

1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 557-567 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars-Gunnar Svensson
Keyword(s):  
Indivisible Goods ◽  
Strategy Proof
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