A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality

Abstract Social choice theory demonstrates that majority rule is generically indeterminate. However, from an empirical perspective, large and arbitrary policy shifts are rare events in politics. The uncovered set (UCS) is the dominant preference-based explanation for the apparent empirical predictability of majority rule in multiple dimensions. Its underlying logic assumes that voters act strategically, considering the ultimate consequences of their actions. I argue that all empirical applications of the UCS rest on an incomplete behavioral model assuming purely egoistically motivated individuals. Beyond material self-interest, prosocial motivations offer an additional factor to explain the outcomes of majority rule. I test my claim in a series of committee decision-making experiments in which I systematically vary the fairness properties of the policy space while keeping the location of the UCS constant. The experimental results overwhelmingly support the prosociality explanation.

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A novel feature selection approach with Pareto optimality for multi-label data

Applied Intelligence ◽

10.1007/s10489-021-02228-2 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Guohe Li ◽

Yong Li ◽

Yifeng Zheng ◽

Ying Li ◽

Yunfeng Hong ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Feature Selection ◽

Pareto Optimality ◽

Label Data ◽

Selection Approach ◽

Feature Selection Approach

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Pareto Optimality and Optimistic Stability in Repeated Extensive Form Games

Journal of Economic Theory ◽

10.1006/jeth.1996.0064 ◽

1996 ◽

Vol 69 (2) ◽

pp. 470-489 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Steven Tadelis

Keyword(s):

Pareto Optimality ◽

Extensive Form ◽

Extensive Form Games

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Voting Systems, Honest Preferences and Pareto Optimality

American Political Science Review ◽

10.2307/1958635 ◽

1973 ◽

Vol 67 (3) ◽

pp. 934-946 ◽

Cited By ~ 38

Author(s):

Richard Zeckhauser

Keyword(s):

Social Choice ◽

Pareto Optimality ◽

The Political ◽

Voting Systems ◽

Political Arena ◽

Decentralized System ◽

Economic Decisions

The market is a decentralized system that can bring about efficient economic decisions. This paper examines whether social choice mechanisms can duplicate this success in the political arena. The famed Arrow result tells us centralized systems cannot achieve efficient, nondictatorial outcomes unless they rely on cardinal preferences. With decentralization, efficiency comes to require something more: the truthful revelation of preferences. Schemes that elicit honest preferences are derived here. By their very structure they are shown to lead to inefficient outcomes. This negative result leads to the question whether the validity of the initial analogy continues. Market-based standards of performance may be innappropriate for investigations of political phenomena.

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Welfare, Workfare, and Pareto Optimality

Public Finance Quarterly ◽

10.1177/109114217300100305 ◽

1973 ◽

Vol 1 (3) ◽

pp. 323-338 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

George E. Peterson

Keyword(s):

Pareto Optimality

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How Well Do We Know Pareto Optimality?

The Journal of Economic Education ◽

10.2307/1182422 ◽

1991 ◽

Vol 22 (2) ◽

pp. 172 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Vijay K. Mathur

Keyword(s):

Pareto Optimality

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Some Sufficiency Conditions for Pareto-Optimal Control

Journal of Dynamic Systems Measurement and Control ◽

10.1115/1.3426735 ◽

1973 ◽

Vol 95 (4) ◽

pp. 356-361 ◽

Cited By ~ 45

Author(s):

G. Leitmann ◽

W. Schmitendorf

Keyword(s):

Optimal Control ◽

Optimal Control Problem ◽

Control Problem ◽

Pareto Optimality ◽

Optimal Control Theory ◽

Cooperative Games ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Pareto Optimal ◽

Vector Valued ◽

Sufficiency Conditions

We consider the optimal control problem with vector-valued criterion (including cooperative games) and seek Pareto-optimal (noninferior) solutions. Scalarization results, together with modified sufficiency theorems from optimal control theory, are used to deduce sufficient conditions for Pareto-optimality. The utilization of these conditions is illustrated by various examples.

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