Welfare, Workfare, and Pareto Optimality

1973 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
George E. Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Guohe Li ◽  
Yong Li ◽  
Yifeng Zheng ◽  
Ying Li ◽  
Yunfeng Hong ◽  
...  

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 934-946 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Zeckhauser

The market is a decentralized system that can bring about efficient economic decisions. This paper examines whether social choice mechanisms can duplicate this success in the political arena. The famed Arrow result tells us centralized systems cannot achieve efficient, nondictatorial outcomes unless they rely on cardinal preferences. With decentralization, efficiency comes to require something more: the truthful revelation of preferences. Schemes that elicit honest preferences are derived here. By their very structure they are shown to lead to inefficient outcomes. This negative result leads to the question whether the validity of the initial analogy continues. Market-based standards of performance may be innappropriate for investigations of political phenomena.


1991 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vijay K. Mathur
Keyword(s):  

1973 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 356-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Leitmann ◽  
W. Schmitendorf

We consider the optimal control problem with vector-valued criterion (including cooperative games) and seek Pareto-optimal (noninferior) solutions. Scalarization results, together with modified sufficiency theorems from optimal control theory, are used to deduce sufficient conditions for Pareto-optimality. The utilization of these conditions is illustrated by various examples.


Author(s):  
Antonio F. Gómez-Skarmeta ◽  
Fernando Jiménez ◽  
Jesús Ibáñez

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-712
Author(s):  
Mikhail Vilgelm ◽  
Sergio Rueda Linares ◽  
Wolfgang Kellerer

1964 ◽  
Vol 40 (92) ◽  
pp. 581-590
Author(s):  
C. S. Soper ◽  
L. R. Webb
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document