scholarly journals Some Spanners in the Works of Grounding Mechanisms Removed

Axiomathes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Stenwall

AbstractIn this paper I address two concerns with Kelly Trogdon’s grounding mechanism view, i.e. the idea that metaphysical explanation can be modeled on causal-mechanical explanation. The first concern threatens to undermine the unity that grounding-mechanical explanations imposes on metaphysical explanation; and the second concern requires the grounding mechanic to put forth a formal condition on grounding-mechanical models. After having discussed both of these, I provide a solution to the first and argue that the second concern is unwarranted.

Author(s):  
Henk W. de Regt

This chapter analyzes the role of mechanical modeling in nineteenth-century physics, showing how precisely mechanical models were used to enhance scientific understanding. It discusses the work and ideas of William Thomson (Lord Kelvin), James Clerk Maxwell, and Ludwig Boltzmann, who advanced explicit views on the function and status of mechanical models, in particular, on their role in providing understanding. A case study of the construction of molecular models to explain the so-called specific heat anomaly highlights the role of conceptual tools in achieving understanding and shows that intelligibility is an epistemically relevant feature of mechanical models. Next, the chapter examines Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie, an interpretation of mechanical models that he developed in response to problems and criticisms of the program of mechanical explanation, and his associated pragmatic conception of understanding. The final section discusses the limitations of mechanical models and Ernst Mach’s criticism of the mechanical program.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-83
Author(s):  
Margaret Cameron

The essence of artefacts is typically taken to be their function: they are defined in terms of the goals or aims of the artisans that make them. In this paper, an alternative theory is proposed that emphasizes, via a reconstruction of Aristotle's various comments about the nature of artefacts, the role of the moving, or efficient, cause of artefacts. This account shifts the emphasis to the role played by the investment of expertise into the creation (and subsequent being) of artefacts. It turns out that expertise is prior in being and prior in explanation to the function of artefacts, and thus plays the most fundamental role in the explanation of the ontology of artefacts.


Disputatio ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (50) ◽  
pp. 245-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sally Haslanger

Abstract In response to commentaries by Esa Díaz León, Jennifer Saul, and Ra- chel Sterken, I develop more fully my views on the role of structure in social and metaphysical explanation. Although I believe that social agency, quite generally, occurs within practices and structures, the relevance of structure depends on the sort of questions we are asking and what interventions we are considering. The emphasis on questions is also relevant in considering metaphysical and meta-metaphysical is- sues about realism with respect to gender and race. I aim to demon- strate that tools we develop in the context of critical social theory can change the questions we ask, what forms of explanation are called for, and how we do philosophy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Effendi Kusuma Sunur

Abstract: What is life? What does it mean when we say that something is alive? What makes something alive? Biology answers the questions with a lot of answers but the answers to the question “what is life?” always have its limitation because its status as an empirical science which starts from the diversity of living things on the Earth. In other words, the answers are not sufficient although they are necessary for us to know what life is. Biology needs a metaphysical explanation to understand more completely the question “what is life?” Metaphysic through the concept of “substantial form” of the Aristotelian-Thomistic thought can contribute an understanding that complements biology to understand “what is life?” with its immanent cause. Keywords: Substantial form, immanent cause, formal cause. Abstrak: Apakah itu kehidupan? Apa artinya ketika kita mengatakan sesuatu sebagai “yang hidup?” Apa yang membuat sesuatu hidup? Biologi menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut dengan berbagai macam jawaban namun jawaban-jawaban biologi terhadap pertanyaan “apakah itu kehidupan?” selalu memiliki keterbatasan karena statusnya sebagai ilmu empiris yang berangkat dari keanekaragaman hayati yang ada di bumi ini. Dengan kata lain, jawaban-jawaban biologi tidak mencukupi walau merupakan hal yang mutlak perlu untuk mengetahui apa yang dimaksud dengan kehidupan. Biologi memerlukan penjelasan metafisis untuk bisa mendapatkan pemahaman yang lebih lengkap akan pertanyaan “apakah itu kehidupan?” Metafisika melalui konsep “forma substansial” Aristotelian-Thomistik dapat menyumbangkan pemahaman yang melengkapi biologi untuk memahami “apakah itu kehidupan?” dengan Causa imanennya. Kata-kata Kunci: Forma substansial, causa imanen, causa formal.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (7) ◽  
pp. 1210
Author(s):  
Zhongqi Wu ◽  
Jianwei Guo ◽  
Jun Xiao ◽  
Xiangyong Zeng ◽  
Ying Wang ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Daniel Greco

The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it shows how versions of physicalism, dualism, and idealism can be formulated as theses about grounding, or metaphysical explanation, rather than as more straightforwardly ontological theses concerning what exists. Second, it argues that this reformulation provides a helpful lens through which to look at arguments in the philosophy of religion. In particular, traditional versions of theism are naturally understood as versions of idealism, once idealism is understood as a thesis about grounding. The chapter goes on to argue that once theism is seen as a version of idealism, theistic arguments from design—in particular, fine-tuning arguments—can be seen to have a limitation that is otherwise easy to overlook. Such arguments can be understood as aiming to convince, not just the atheist, but the physicalist and/or dualist. And this turns out to be harder than one might have thought.


Author(s):  
Richard Reilly

The focus of this chapter is Schopenhauer’s On The Basis of Morality (1841). His distinctive views are that compassion marks one’s being as spontaneously motivated to relieve another’s suffering as one’s own and that this requires a metaphysical explanation for how one identifies with another. The author defends these views and shows in some detail how they mirror the Mahayana account of compassion in Shantideva’s The Way of the Bodhisattva. Next, the author outlines Schopenhauer’s case for compassion being the sole basis of moral value and defends this claim against the Kantian view that acting beneficently cannot (rationally) override so-called perfect duties to others. Finally, the author explores how Buddha Shakyamuni’s teachings cohere with Schopenhauer’s account of suffering and how mystical consciousness, as represented in Mahayana Buddhism’s “Middle Way,” coheres with Schopenhauer’s asceticism—the “denial of the will”—as the path to overcoming suffering.


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