Some Spanners in the Works of Grounding Mechanisms Removed

In this paper I address two concerns with Kelly Trogdon’s grounding mechanism view, i.e. the idea that metaphysical explanation can be modeled on causal-mechanical explanation. The first concern threatens to undermine the unity that grounding-mechanical explanations imposes on metaphysical explanation; and the second concern requires the grounding mechanic to put forth a formal condition on grounding-mechanical models. After having discussed both of these, I provide a solution to the first and argue that the second concern is unwarranted.

Arbitrary grounding

The aim of this paper is to introduce, elucidate and defend the usefulness of a variant of grounding, or metaphysical explanation, that has the feature that the grounds explain of some states of affairs that one of them obtains without explaining which one obtains. I will dub this variant arbitrary grounding. After informally elucidating the basic idea in the first section, I will provide three metaphysical hypotheses that are best formulated in terms of arbitrary grounding in the second section. The third section will be concerned with the relation between arbitrary grounding and non-arbitrary grounding. The fourth section will compare arbitrary grounding to two extant proposals in the literature.

Sophie of Hanover on the Soul–Body Relationship

This chapter aims to examine Sophie of Hanover’s original, but often overlooked contribution to the debate over the soul–body relationship. It explains that her main interest is in problems pertaining to the influence of bodily motion on the soul, for instance how the mother’s physiological imagination has an impact on the development of the foetus or how ideas are caused by material determinations. It also argues that Sophie remains sceptical of any metaphysical explanation in the domain of rational psychology, for instance of the Leibnizian hypothesis of pre-established harmony. For a similar reason, I contend that it is very unlikely that Sophie would maintain a materialistic conception of ideas, as commentators have argued.

Nomothetic Explanation and Humeanism about Laws of Nature

Humeanism about laws of nature—the view that the laws reduce to the Humean mosaic—is a popular view, but currently existing versions face powerful objections. The non-supervenience objection, the non-fundamentality objection, and the explanatory circularity objection have all been thought to cause problems for Humeanism. However, these objections share a guiding thought—they are all based on the idea that there is a certain kind of divergence between the practice of science and the metaphysical picture suggested by Humeanism. I suggest that the Humean should respond to these objections not by rejecting this divergence, but by arguing that it is appropriate. The Humean should distinguish between scientific and metaphysical explanation. And they should leverage this into distinctions between scientific and metaphysical fundamentality and scientific and metaphysical possibility. We can use these distinctions to respond to the objections that the Humean faces.

Tractatus Parmenideo-Philosophicus

In making the Parmenidean Ascent, one transcends metaphysical distinctions and is freed from the illusions of relational thinking. This freedom from the burden of attempting to make our words and sentences match or correspond to an independent reality and to invest our thoughts with metaphysical significance promises to enable us finally to see the world aright as Wittgenstein would put it. This chapter—which is as far as possible freed from any distinctions— is an imperfect attempt to exhibit the spirit of play that comes with the freedom from relational metaphysical explanation.

Metaphysical Explanation

In chapter 8, the Parmenidean, Bradleyan methodology turns its sights on metaphysical explanation. The Parmenidean Ascent in this chapter does not proceed—as in previous chapters—by showing that proponents of this notion fail to meet an explanatory demand. Rather, the argument is that proponents of metaphysical explanation are committed to irrational actions in positing certain facts. These actions are arbitrary, performed without sufficient reason, and violate Ockham’s Razor, which counsels us not to multiply entities without needing to do so. This chapter shows how attempts by Schaffer to avoid the force of this argument by modifying Ockham’s Razor are inadequate. Throughout the chapter, connections between this argument and Quine’s arguments against modality are highlighted. The upshot is that differentiated, relational metaphysical explanation needs to be given up, that a structured ontology must be rejected, and that we must make a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to metaphysical explanation.

The Parmenidean Ascent

The central aim of The Parmenidean Ascent is to reveal the power of an extreme monism of a Parmenidean variety in a more uncompromising manner than has been attempted for many a year. For the Parmenidean monist, there are no distinctions whatsoever, and indeed distinctions are unintelligible. The book not only defends—against the tide of much recent scholarship—the attribution of such a sweeping monism to Parmenides, it also embraces this monism in its own right and expands these monistic results to many of the most crucial areas of philosophy. The topics that come in for this rationalistic, monistic treatment include being, action, knowledge, meaning, truth, and metaphysical explanation. There is thus no differentiated being, no differentiated action, knowledge, etc. Rather all is being, just as all is action, knowledge, etc. The motive force behind this argument is a combination of a detailed survey of the failures of leading positions (both historical and contemporary) to meet a demand for the explanation of a given phenomenon, and a powerful rationalist, Bradleyan argument against the reality of relations. The result is a rationalist rejection of all distinctions and a skeptical denial of the intelligibility of ordinary, relational notions of being, action, knowledge, etc. A further significant upshot is the rejection of any distinction between philosophy itself and the study of its history. Throughout the book, attention is paid to philosophical methods, including especially the method, so popular today, of relying on intuitions and common sense. The historically minded and rationalist approach throughout this book goes a long way toward demonstrating the ultimate bankruptcy of this prevalent methodology.