scholarly journals Humean Supervenience, Composition as Identity and Quantum Wholes

Erkenntnis ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 81 (6) ◽  
pp. 1173-1194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio Calosi ◽  
Matteo Morganti
Keyword(s):  
Humean Supervenience ◽  
Composition As Identity

Humean Supervenience

2017 ◽  
pp. 176-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARRY LOEWER
Keyword(s):  
Humean Supervenience

Metaphysics of composition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Brenner
Keyword(s):  
Leibniz’S Law ◽  
Composition As Identity ◽  
Special Composition Question ◽  
Grounding Problem ◽  
Composite Objects ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Special Composition

Composition occurs when one or more objects are parts of another object. The metaphysics of composition concerns the nature of composition – i.e. what it is, and how it works. Some of the more important questions philosophers have regarding the metaphysics of composition are the following: (1) When does composition occur? This is van Inwagen’s ‘Special Composition Question’. Four prominent answers to this question include: (i) objects compose another object when those former objects are in contact; (ii) any two or more objects compose another object; (iii) objects never compose another object; (iv) objects compose another object when the activities of the former objects constitute a life. (2) Are composite objects identical with their parts? Proponents of ‘composition as identity’ answer ‘yes’ to this question. There are two primary variants of composition as identity, ‘strong’ composition as identity and ‘weak’ composition as identity. The most prominent objection to strong composition as identity is an objection from Leibniz’s Law: composite objects cannot be identical with their parts, since they seem to have properties which their parts do not have. (3) Is it possible for one object to constitute another object? Here ‘constitution’ is the relation which is alleged to obtain between, for example, a clay statue and the lump of clay from which it is formed. We can distinguish between the thesis that constitution is identity, and the thesis that constitution is not identity. The chief motivation which leads some philosophers to reject the thesis that constitution is not identity is the ‘grounding problem’ for that thesis. (4) Are there, in addition to composite objects, the ‘forms’ of those objects, and if so, what is the relationship between composite objects and their forms? We can distinguish between (at least) two variants of hylomorphism (the thesis that objects have forms), with the main distinction between the two views being whether or not they regard forms as being among the parts of composite objects.

Some Additional Metaphysical Questions

2019 ◽  
pp. 148-154
Author(s):  
Peter Ludlow
Keyword(s):  
Human Activity ◽  
Humean Supervenience ◽  
Low Level ◽  
Mctaggart’S Argument

The book has been making the case that perspectival content is necessary for the explanation of much of human activity, and that the best approach to tense is to think in terms of interperspectival contents. It has already covered a number of metaphysical worries about tense and perspectival contents (McTaggart’s argument, for example) but there are two additional worries that need to be addressed. The first has to do with the problem of truth-makers. The second has to do with the kinds of contents that are metaphysically admissible. It is argued that metaphysical concerns about truth-makers and Humean supervenience do not undermine the positing of interperspectival contents. Such contents are part and parcel of basic low-level descriptions and they do not thwart attempts at naturalization of our accounts of action, emotion, etc.

Humean Supervenience and Possible Worlds

2020 ◽  
pp. 492-528
Author(s):  
Paul Noordhof
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Humean Supervenience ◽  
Counterfactual Theory ◽  
Reductive Account

The position defended is compatible with a coherent development of a reductive account of modality. It is less significant for the principle of recombination than previously thought and the principle of recombination is unlikely to play successfully its role as a principle of plenitude in any event. The distinct existences principle is defended against an argument that it is necessarily false. In fact, by comparison, we have more reason to believe in the possibility of worlds in which Humean supervenience is true and there is causation, than in physicalism about phenomenal consciousness. The counterfactual theory of causation, and surrounding framework, explains why this is the appropriate verdict at which to arrive. Some aspects of the variety of causation may be understood as a determinate-determinable relation but the different vertically fundamental bases are better understood as partial realizations. Causation is one horizontally fundamental metaphysical category but there may be others.

scholarly journals Humean supervenience and tripartite entanglement relations

Axiomathes ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Lorenzetti
Keyword(s):  
Wave Function ◽  
Quantum Entanglement ◽  
Humean Supervenience ◽  
Tripartite Entanglement ◽  
Conservative Strategy ◽  
Ghz States ◽  
Entanglement States ◽  
Spatiotemporal Relations

Abstract It has been argued that Humean Supervenience (HS) is threatened by the existence of quantum entanglement relations. The most conservative strategy for defending HS is to add the problematic entanglement relations to the supervenience basis, alongside spatiotemporal relations. In this paper, I’m going to argue against this strategy by showing how certain particular cases of tripartite entanglement states – i.e. GHZ states – posit some crucial problems for this amended version of HS. Moreover, I will show that the principle of free recombination – which is strictly linked to HS – is severely undermined if we add entanglement relations to the supervenience basis. I conclude that the conservative move is very unappealing, and therefore the defender of HS should pursue other, more controversial, strategies (e.g. committing to the nomological interpretation of the wave function).

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document