The Attributional–Counterfactual Theory of Need: Integrating Theories to Predict Need Norm Use

The justice literature has coalesced around the notion that actors (e.g., supervisors) tend to utilize the norm of equity for resource allocation decisions because it is generally considered most fair when employees who contribute more to the organization receive more resources. Yet, actors might sometimes utilize a need norm to allocate resources to those most in need. Studies that have addressed need-based resource allocations have assumed a relatively straightforward conceptualization of need. However, research from related areas suggests that multiple characteristics of the need itself could trigger actors’ use of a need norm to allocate resources. We advance a theoretical framework that outlines various need characteristics that drive actors’ use of a need norm. The framework draws on the processes outlined in attribution theory and integrates those with the content domains addressed in fairness theory. A discussion of the implications for justice, attribution, and fairness theory research follows.

Humean Supervenience and Possible Worlds

The position defended is compatible with a coherent development of a reductive account of modality. It is less significant for the principle of recombination than previously thought and the principle of recombination is unlikely to play successfully its role as a principle of plenitude in any event. The distinct existences principle is defended against an argument that it is necessarily false. In fact, by comparison, we have more reason to believe in the possibility of worlds in which Humean supervenience is true and there is causation, than in physicalism about phenomenal consciousness. The counterfactual theory of causation, and surrounding framework, explains why this is the appropriate verdict at which to arrive. Some aspects of the variety of causation may be understood as a determinate-determinable relation but the different vertically fundamental bases are better understood as partial realizations. Causation is one horizontally fundamental metaphysical category but there may be others.

Processes and Prevention

The proposed analysis of causation is compatible with allowing that there are ways to distinguish the variety that falls under it. The same characteristics as those who take causation to involve substantial causal processes characterize kinds of causation without these characteristics themselves serve to characterize causation in general. This is an advantage because the theories that make an appeal to substantial processes in understanding causation face considerable difficulties. The attempt to tie causation to the presence of substantial causal processes between cause and effect fails to be justified by appeal to responsibility, or by its capacity to make sense of causal locality and the intrinsic character of causal processes. Some claim that a counterfactual theory closes off certain options with regard to the property understanding of Bell inequalities. This is not the case.

A Counterfactual Approach to Explanation in Mathematics

ABSTRACT Our goal in this paper is to extend counterfactual accounts of scientific explanation to mathematics. Our focus, in particular, is on intra-mathematical explanations: explanations of one mathematical fact in terms of another. We offer a basic counterfactual theory of intra-mathematical explanations, before modelling the explanatory structure of a test case using counterfactual machinery. We finish by considering the application of counterpossibles to mathematical explanation, and explore a second test case along these lines.

Counterfactual Scheming

Mathematics appears to play a genuine explanatory role in science. But how do mathematical explanations work? Recently, a counterfactual approach to mathematical explanation has been suggested. I argue that such a view fails to differentiate the explanatory uses of mathematics within science from the non-explanatory uses. I go on to offer a solution to this problem by combining elements of the counterfactual theory of explanation with elements of a unification theory of explanation. The result is a theory according to which a counterfactual is explanatory when it is an instance of a generalized counterfactual scheme.