Excited states of isolated fermions in the Higgs phase of gauge Higgs theories

We present evidence that seemingly elementary and non-composite objects, namely isolated static fermions in certain gauge Higgs theories, have a mass spectrum corresponding to localized excitations of the surrounding gauge and Higgs fields.

XRF and 3D Modelling on a Composite Etruscan Helmet

The presentation of X-ray fluorescence data (XRF) assays is commonly restricted to tables or graphical representations. While the latter may sometimes be in a 3D format, they have yet to incorporate the actual objects they are from. The presentation of multiple XRF assays on a 3D model allows for more accessible presentation of data, particularly for composite objects, and aids in their interpretation. We present a method to display and interpolate assay data on 3D models using the PyVista Python package. This creates a texture of the object that displays the relative differences in elemental composition. A crested helmet from Tomb 1036 from the Casale del Fosso necropolis, Veii, Italy, is used to exemplify this method. The results of the analysis are presented and show variation in composition across the helmet, which also corresponds with macroscopic and decorrelation stretching analyses.

What are empirical consequences? On dispensability and composite objects

Philosophers sometimes give arguments that presuppose the following principle: two theories can fail to be empirically equivalent on the sole basis that they present different “thick” metaphysical pictures of the world. Recently, a version of this principle has been invoked to respond to the argument that composite objects are dispensable to our best scientific theories. This response claims that our empirical evidence distinguishes between ordinary and composite-free theories, and it empirically favors the ordinary ones (Hofweber 2016, 2018). In this paper, I ask whether this response to the dispensability argument is tenable. I claim that it is not. This is because it presupposes an indefensible thesis about when two empirical consequences are distinct or the same. My argument provides some insight into what our empirical consequences are, and I conclude that empirical evidence is radically metaphysically neutral. This gives us some insight into the significant content of our scientific theories—the content that a scientific realist is committed to—and I show how this insight relates to questions about theoretical equivalence more broadly.

Ontological Expressivism

Ontological expressivism is the view that ontological existence claims express noncognitive mental states. The chapter develops a version of ontological expressivism that is modeled after Gibbard’s (2003) norm-expressivism. It argues that, when speakers assess whether, say, composite objects exist, they rely on assumptions with regard to what is required for composition to occur. These assumptions guide their assessment, similar to how norms may guide the assessment of normative propositions. Against this backdrop, the chapter argues that “some objects have parts”, uttered in the context of an ontological disagreement, expresses a noncognitive disposition to assess the truth of propositions by using only rules of assessment according to which the proposition that some objects have parts is to be evaluated as true.

Non-destructive handheld XRF study of archaeological composite silver objects—the case study of the late Roman Seuso Treasure

This study details the non-destructive chemical analysis of composite silver objects (ewers, situlas, amphora and casket) from one of the most significant late Roman finds, the Seuso Treasure. The Seuso Treasure consists of fourteen large silver vessels that were made in the fourth–early fifth centuries AD and used for dining during festive banquets and for washing and beautification. The measurements were systematically performed along a pre-designed grid at several points using handheld X-ray fluorescence analysis. The results demonstrate that all the objects were made from high-quality silver (above 90 wt% Ag), with the exception of the base of the Geometric Ewer B. Copper was added intentionally to improve the mechanical properties of soft silver. The gold and lead content of the objects shows constant values (less than 1 wt% Au and Pb). The chemical composition as well as the Bi/Pb ratio suggests that the parts of the composite objects were manufactured from different silver ingots. The ewers were constructed in two ways: (i) the base and the body were made separately, or (ii) the ewer was raised from a single silver sheet. The composite objects were assembled using three methods: (i) mechanical attachment; (ii) low-temperature, lead-tin soft solders; or (iii) high-temperature, copper-silver hard solders. Additionally, two types of gilding were revealed by the XRF analysis, one with remnants of mercury, i.e. fire-gilding, and another type without remnants of mercury, presumably diffusion bonding.

Dynamic Molding Deposition: The additive manufacturing in partially ordered system

Additive manufacturing (AM) is now identified as a powerful bundle of fabrication techniques. Limitations were identified to be mostly related to the availability of reformulated materials compatible with existing AM technologies. What if we were able to dynamically generate sacrificial molds with unlimited architectures and material composition? We have discovered such a process, called Dynamic Molding Deposition (DMD) in partially ordered powder system and demonstrated its capacity to produce highly complex objects with 100 µm resolution, without any building plate or support structures. The DMD compatible materials were shown to be almost infinite, from low to high viscosity, from thermoplastic to elastomers. Our process enables us to build unexpected composite objects made up of injection material and powder grains from the dynamic mold. This feature opens the path to a complete new field of research and applications.

How Ordinary Objects Fit into Reality

This chapter by Bryan Frances argues against sparse compositional nihilism, the view that there are no composite objects, such as tables and trees. Even granting crucial nihilist assumptions, he argues that composite objects can reduce to simples, showing how a table or tree might exist while not being single things.

Non-Factualism about Composite Objects (or Why There’s No Fact of the Matter Whether Any Material Objects Exist)

Chapter 4 provides an argument for a non-factualist view of the composite-object question; i.e., it argues that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as composite objects like tables and rocks and cats (where a composite object is an object that has proper parts). In addition, this chapter explains how the argument can be extended to establish the much more general (and much more radical) conclusion that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any material objects at all—including mereological simples (i.e., objects that don’t have any proper parts). The argument proceeds by undermining the necessitarian and contingentist views of the composite-object question; so, roughly speaking, the idea is that there isn’t a fact of the matter about the existence of composite objects like tables because there isn’t a necessary fact about this and there also isn’t a contingent fact about it.

Introduction

Chapter 1 provides a synopsis of the entire book. Roughly speaking, the book does two things. First, it introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view and argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions—most notably, the question of whether there are any abstract objects and the question of whether there are any composite objects. Second, the book explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism, and it explains how we could argue that neo-positivism is true. Neo-positivism is (roughly) the view that every metaphysical question decomposes into subquestions, and in connection with each of these subquestions, we can endorse one of the following three anti-metaphysical views: non-factualism, or scientism, or metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism. Non-factualism about a question Q is the view that there’s no fact of the matter about the answer to Q. Scientism about Q is (roughly) the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some aspect of physical reality, and Q can’t be settled with an a priori philosophical argument. And metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Q is (roughly) the view that Q asks about the truth value of a modal sentence that’s metaphysically innocent in the sense that it doesn’t say anything about reality and, if it’s true, isn’t made true by reality.