David Rönnegard: The Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-189
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Malzkorn
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Corporate Moral Agency

scholarly journals Relationships, Authority, and Reasons: A Second-Personal Account of Corporate Moral Agency

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Alan D. Morrison ◽  
Rita Mota ◽  
William J. Wilhelm
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Culture ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Corporate Communications ◽  
Personal Account ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Corporate Moral Agency ◽  
Fresh Perspective ◽  
Corporate Punishment

We present a second-personal account of corporate moral agency. This approach is in contrast to the first-personal approach adopted in much of the existing literature, which concentrates on the corporation’s ability to identify moral reasons for itself. Our account treats relationships and communications as the fundamental building blocks of moral agency. The second-personal account rests on a framework developed by Darwall. Its central requirement is that corporations be capable of recognizing the authority relations that they have with other moral agents. We discuss the relevance of corporate affect, corporate communications, and corporate culture to the second-personal account. The second-personal account yields a new way to specify first-personal criteria for moral agency, and it generates fresh insights into the reasons those criteria matter. In addition, a second-personal analysis implies that moral agency is partly a matter of policy, and it provides a fresh perspective on corporate punishment.

Corporate moral agency as an epistemological organizing principle

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan E. Singer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Corporate Moral Agency

The Moral Status of the Corporation: Comments on an Inquiry

1992 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 461-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Nesteruk
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Corporate Law ◽  
Philosophical Issue ◽  
Valuable Contribution ◽  
Legal Scholarship ◽  
Corporate Moral Agency

Corporate moral agency is an important philosophical issue with significant implications for corporate law scholarship. While some legal scholars have recognized the significance of this issue for the analysis of corporate law, legal scholars generally have yet to give it the kind of attention and thorough examination it deserves. In this regard, Michael Phillips makes a valuable contribution to the debate, exploring how theories of the corporation prevalent in legal scholarship bear on the question of corporate moral agency. His analysis provides us with many insights. Still, I wish to raise some questions regarding his approach. Raising these questions, I believe, will help us to recognize more fully the possibilities the issue of corporate moral agency holds for corporate law scholarship.

Corporate Moral Agency and Artificial Intelligence

2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan E. Singer
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Corporate Moral Agency ◽  
Philosophical Pragmatism

The debate about the moral status of corporations has been wide-ranging and complex. In this paper a way of structuring the debate is proposed. At the same time, arguments within the “corporate moral agency” debate are considered in relation to the notion of Artificial Moral Agency. The entire exercise points to the importance of philosophical pragmatism and the prospect of ‘artificial ethics’.

Corporate moral agency: A case from literature

1994 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas L. Carson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Corporate Moral Agency

scholarly journals Moral agents and legal persons: the ethics and the law of state responsibility

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 466-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Fleming
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
State Responsibility ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Functional Theory ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Corporate Moral Agency ◽  
The Law

Why, if at all, does it make sense to assign some responsibilities to states rather than to individuals? There are two contemporary answers. According to the agential theory, states can be held responsible because they are moral agents, much like human beings. According to the functional theory, states can be held responsible because they are legal persons that act vicariously through individuals, much like principals who act through agents. The two theories of state responsibility belong to parallel traditions of scholarship that have never been clearly distinguished. While the agential theory is dominant in IR, political theory, and philosophy, the functional theory prevails in International Law. The purpose of this article is to bridge the gulf between ethical and legal approaches to state responsibility. I argue that IR scholars and political theorists have much to gain from the functional theory. First, it provides a plausible alternative to the agential theory that avoids common objections to corporate moral agency. Second, the functional theory helps us to understand features of International Law that have puzzled IR scholars and political theorists, such as the fact that states are not held criminally responsible. I suggest that states can be ‘moral principals’ instead of moral agents.

The Anti-Sweatshop Movement: Constructing Corporate Moral Agency in the Global Apparel Industry

2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca De Winter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Agent ◽  
Apparel Industry ◽  
Transnational Advocacy ◽  
Corporate Rights ◽  
Advocacy Network ◽  
Corporate Moral Agency ◽  
Human Rights Standards ◽  
Shared Understandings ◽  
The Impact

This essay examines the impact of activist mobilization within the anti-sweatshop movement on shared understandings of corporate moral agency. The anti-sweatshop movement represents a transnational advocacy network, which arose in response to the global restructuring of the apparel industry and is organizing to demand that apparel manufacturers be accountable to communities, workers, and consumers. The movement has been central in contesting received notions of corporate rights and responsibilities and in reconstituting the boundaries of the corporate moral agent. Underpinning this investigation is a discussion of the ascription of moral agency to collective actors. With the aid of a relational approach, it is argued that corporate moral agency is a construct emerging out of social historical interactions that reflect processes through which the boundaries of actors are drawn and justified. Through the use of rhetoric linking private economic transactions and international labor and human rights standards, the movement has successfully challenged corporate practices that were previously considered unremarkable.

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