scholarly journals Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms: experimental evidence

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Castillo ◽  
Ahrash Dianat
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Stable Matching ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty

scholarly journals Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in discontinuous games

2019 ◽  
Vol 183 ◽  
pp. 786-822 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Bich
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Discontinuous Games ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty

scholarly journals Endogenous Price Leadership with Asymmetric Costs: Experimental Evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-74
Author(s):  
Miguel A. Fonseca
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
High Frequency ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Differentiated Products ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty ◽  
Price Leadership ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Asymmetric Costs ◽  
Simultaneous Move

This paper presents experimental evidence on the action commitment game with cost-asymmetric firms in a differentiated-products Bertrand duopoly. Unlike its quantity-setting counterpart, the risk-dominant leader–follower equilibrium Pareto dominates the simultaneous-move equilibrium. This equilibrium also minimizes payoff differences between firms. Hence, one would expect the model to accurately capture behavior. The evidence partially supports the theory: low-cost firms price in the first period more often than high-cost firms, and depending on the treatment, between 40 and 57 per cent of all observations conform to equilibrium play. However, the modal timing outcome involved both firms delaying their pricing decision. This timing outcome is characterized by Nash play and some collusion. The high frequency of delaying decisions could be due to a desire to reduce strategic uncertainty.

Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games

1991 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 885-910 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. B. Van Huyck ◽  
R. C. Battalio ◽  
R. O. Beil
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty

scholarly journals Strategic Robustness in Bi-level System-of-systems Design

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan L Stern ◽  
Paul T. Grogan ◽  
Ambrosio Valencia-Romero
Keyword(s):  
Preferential Attachment ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Selection Criterion ◽  
Systems Design ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Small World ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty ◽  
Managerial Control ◽  
Robust Designs

Robust designs protect system utility in the presence of uncertainty in technical and operational outcomes. Systems-of-systems, which lack centralized managerial control, are vulnerable to strategic uncertainty from coordination failures between partially or completely independent system actors. This work assesses the suitability of a game-theoretic equilibrium selection criterion to measure system robustness to strategic uncertainty and investigates the effect of strategically robust designs on collaborative behavior. The work models interactions between agents in a thematic representation of a mobile computing technology transition using an evolutionary game theory framework. Strategic robustness and collaborative solutions are assessed over a range of conditions by varying agent payoffs. Models are constructed on small world, preferential attachment, and random graph topologies and executed in batch simulations. Results demonstrate that systems designed to reduce the impacts of coordination failure stemming from strategic uncertainty also increase the stability of the collaborative strategy by increasing the probability of collaboration by partners; a form of robustness by environment shaping that has not been previously investigated in design literature. The work also demonstrates that strategy selection follows the risk dominance equilibrium selection criterion and that changes in robustness to coordination failure can be measured with this criterion.

scholarly journals Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games: experimental evidence on the role of precedents

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 573-600 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Duffy ◽  
Dietmar Fehr
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Equilibrium Selection

How do memory modules differentially contribute to familiarity and recollection?

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olya Hakobyan ◽  
Sen Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Recognition Memory ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Memory Modules ◽  
Familiarity And Recollection ◽  
Memory Contents

Abstract We fully support dissociating the subjective experience from the memory contents in recognition memory, as Bastin et al. posit in the target article. However, having two generic memory modules with qualitatively different functions is not mandatory and is in fact inconsistent with experimental evidence. We propose that quantitative differences in the properties of the memory modules can account for the apparent dissociation of recollection and familiarity along anatomical lines.

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