Strategic Robustness in Bi-level System-of-systems Design

Robust designs protect system utility in the presence of uncertainty in technical and operational outcomes. Systems-of-systems, which lack centralized managerial control, are vulnerable to strategic uncertainty from coordination failures between partially or completely independent system actors. This work assesses the suitability of a game-theoretic equilibrium selection criterion to measure system robustness to strategic uncertainty and investigates the effect of strategically robust designs on collaborative behavior. The work models interactions between agents in a thematic representation of a mobile computing technology transition using an evolutionary game theory framework. Strategic robustness and collaborative solutions are assessed over a range of conditions by varying agent payoffs. Models are constructed on small world, preferential attachment, and random graph topologies and executed in batch simulations. Results demonstrate that systems designed to reduce the impacts of coordination failure stemming from strategic uncertainty also increase the stability of the collaborative strategy by increasing the probability of collaboration by partners; a form of robustness by environment shaping that has not been previously investigated in design literature. The work also demonstrates that strategy selection follows the risk dominance equilibrium selection criterion and that changes in robustness to coordination failure can be measured with this criterion.

Levers of Control and Managerial Performance: The Importance of Belief Systems

Belief systems, which are one of the four levers of control, play a vital role in an organization. This study is primarily aimed at examining the effects of belief systems on managerial performance. Since the four levers of control jointly function in management control systems, we extend our study by investigating whether the contingent-fit between strategic risk, strategic uncertainty, and the other three levers of control (i.e., boundary systems, diagnostic control, and interactive control) strengthens the association between belief systems and managerial performance. A survey questionnaire was distributed to the upper-level management of various companies or strategic business units in Indonesia during the fourth quarter of 2017, resulting in 81 respondents. Hypotheses testing were conducted using the OLS regression model. This research found that belief systems are positively associated with managerial performance, indicating that the implementation of effective belief systems leads to higher managerial performance. This study also found that the contingent-fit between strategic risk, strategic uncertainty, and the other three levers of control does not have any effect on how belief systems are positively associated with managerial performance. This finding indicates that although management does not adopt a fit combination between its level of strategic risk and strategic uncertainty and the boundary systems, diagnostic control, and interactive control, it can still achieve good performance as long as strong belief systems are implemented. These findings confirm the critical role of belief systems in the levers of control. Thus, management needs to ensure the establishment of more effective belief systems if the company or business unit wants to produce optimal performance.

Adverse and Advantageous Selection in the Laboratory

We study two-player games where one-sided asymmetric information can lead to either adverse or advantageous selection. We contrast behavior in these games with settings where both players are uninformed. We find stark differences, suggesting that subjects do account for endogenous selection effects. Removing strategic uncertainty increases the fraction of subjects who account for selection. Subjects respond more to adverse than advantageous selection. Using additional treatments where we vary payoff feedback, we connect this difference to learning. We also observe a significant fraction of subjects who appear to understand selection effects but do not apply that knowledge. (JEL C92, D82, D91)

An exploratory study of heuristics for anticipating prices

PurposeThis research explores how investment and central bankers cope with strategic uncertainty when they anticipate prices. The uncertainty originates from others' decisions and their consequences, and cannot be meaningfully reduced to risk. The authors postulate that, in order to cope with this type of uncertainty, bankers use simple rules, also called heuristics. This study aims to identify such heuristics and the psychological processes that underlie them.Design/methodology/approachThe authors interviewed 22 managers of teams tasked to anticipate prices, in two leading investment and central banks. The primary data came from in-depth, semi-structured interviews lasting 30–60 min, supplemented by our observations during the on-site visits, emails and phone calls when preparing the interviews, and reports published by the banks. Data were coded and heuristics were induced over multiple rounds by multiple researchers.FindingsBankers (1) construct simple game representations of markets, (2) make inferences to gauge opponents, (3) become alert when they see too much agreement and (4) communicate coherent narratives. Heuristics (1)–(3) are employed when the pace of decision-making is fast, whereas (4) is used for longer time scales. In sum, bankers exhibit reciprocal bounded rationality, wherein interaction partners are mutually aware of and adapted to the fundamental uncertainty of the task and their limited resources.Originality/valueHeuristics for anticipating prices have not been studied empirically outside the lab. The findings may help integrate conceptualizations of heuristics in the simple-rules and fast-and-frugal-heuristics research programs and improve market efficiency.

Antecedentes do Sistema de Controle Gerencial em Cooperativas de Crédito da Região Sul do Brasil

Objective: Considering the turbulent economic environment as well as the peculiarities of the operations conducted by cooperative entities, this study sought to analyze the connections between strategic risks and uncertainties and the use of the Management Control System (MCS) by credit cooperatives in Brazil’s South region.Method: This is a quantitative study, conducted as a survey with a sample of 57 credit cooperatives. The data was analyzed through Structural equation modeling, with partial least square estimation on SmartPLS 3.0 software. The strategic risk and strategic uncertainty constructs were analyzed in relation to their connection with Simons’ Levers of Control (1995), which contemplates the beliefs and boundary controls and interactive and diagnostic control systems. Furthermore, the connections between the four Levers of Control are also analyzed.Originality/Relevance: The study covers the antecedents (strategic risks and uncertainties) of MCS use, contemplating different compositions of type and class in credit cooperatives, taking previous studies into consideration, as well as covering a singular and pertinent region in the context of Brazilian credit cooperatives.Results: Strategic risk is not associated with the use of the Management Control System. Strategic uncertainty was proven to be the element that receives the most importance from managers in the process of using the four Levers of Control. Regarding the beliefs system construct, its importance is positively linked to the interactive control system, as also occurs with the connection between the interactive control system and the diagnostic control system.Theoretical/Methodological contributions: The study demonstrates the pertinence of the Levers of Control for credit cooperatives, inserted in the context of strategic risks and uncertainties.Social/management contributions: The findings bring about relevant contributions by proving that the balanced use of the four Levers of Control is relevant for promoting the strategic renovation of credit cooperatives, especially regarding strategic uncertainty.

Rank Uncertainty in Organizations

A principal incentivizes a team of agents to work by privately offering them bonuses contingent on team success. We study the principal’s optimal incentive scheme that implements work as a unique equilibrium. This scheme leverages rank uncertainty to address strategic uncertainty. Each agent is informed only of a ranking distribution and his own bonus, the latter making work dominant provided that higher-rank agents work. If agents are symmetric, their bonuses are identical. Thus, discrimination is strictly suboptimal, in sharp contrast with the case of public contracts (Winter 2004). We characterize how agents’ ranking and compensation vary with asymmetric effort costs. (JEL D23, D62, D81, D82, D86)

A theoretical foundation for games of complete/incomplete contracts

This paper provides a theoretical foundation for complete/incomplete contracts to extend game theory for multi-agent interactions. We explain why rational agents may agree to sign incomplete contracts even though signing a complete contract incurs no cost. Some arguments claim that an incomplete contract creates strategic uncertainty. Under common assumptions of rationality, an incomplete contract can be the final solution if the agents’ attitudes toward uncertainty are not neutral. Assuming that agents can form coalitions by participating in the game and they are uncertainty averse, we develop equilibrium solutions for complete/incomplete contracts in an extensive game of multi-agent interactions.