What About the Victim? Neglected Dimensions of the Standing to Blame

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Edlich
Keyword(s):  
Standing To Blame

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 6

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
New Orleans ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Moral Testimony ◽  
Quality Of Will ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Standing To Blame

This is the sixth volume of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. The papers were drawn from the fourth biennial New Orleans Workshop in Agency and Responsibility (NOWAR), held November 2–4, 2017. The essays cover a wide range of topics relevant to agency and responsibility: the threat of neuroscience to free will; the relevance of resentment and guilt to responsibility; how control and self-control pertain to moral agency, oppression, and poverty; responsibility for joint agency; the role and conditions of shame in theories of attributability; how one might take responsibility without blameworthy quality of will; what it means to have standing to blame others; the relevance of moral testimony to moral responsibility; how to build a theory of attributabiity that captures all the relevant cases; and how thinking about blame better enables us to dissolve a dispute in moral philosophy between actualists and possibilists.

Why the moral equality account of the hypocrite’s lack of standing to blame fails

Analysis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Moral Equality ◽  
Standing To Blame ◽  
Better Than

Abstract It is commonly believed that blamees can dismiss hypocritical blame on the ground that the hypocrite has no standing to blame their target. Many believe that the feature of hypocritical blame that undermines standing to blame is that it involves an implicit denial of the moral equality of persons. After all, the hypocrite treats herself better than her blamee for no good reason. In the light of the complement to hypocrites and a comparison of hypocritical and non-hypocritical blamers subscribing to hierarchical moral norms, I show why we must reject the moral equality account of the hypocrite’s lack of standing to blame.

scholarly journals Manipulation Arguments and the Standing to Blame

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matt King
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Manipulation Arguments ◽  
Standing To Blame

The majority of recent work on the moral standing to blame (the idea that A may be unable to legitimately blame B despite B being blameworthy) has focused on blamers who themselves are blameworthy. This is unfortunate, for there is much to learn about the standing to blame once we consider a broader range of cases. Doing so reveals that challenged standing is more expansive than previously acknowledged, and accounts that have privileged the fact that the blamers are themselves morally culpable likely require revision. One such account figures in Patrick Todd’s (2012) argument for incompatibilism, which ostensibly depends on considerations involving the standing to blame. I believe this argument fails. But its failure is instructive, for it allows us to appreciate the numerous ways in which one’s blame can be morally problematic, and hence ways in which one’s standing to blame can be challenged. Thus, while one objective of this paper is to show why Todd’s argument fails, the larger aim is to use that argument to frame discussion of some important (and novel) ways in which the standing to blame can be compromised.

Complicity and hypocrisy

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-181
Author(s):  
Nicolas Cornell ◽  
Amy Sepinwall
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Law ◽  
Standing To Blame ◽  
Moral Convictions

This article offers a justification for accommodating claims of conscience. The standard justification points to the pain that acting against one’s conscience entails. But that defense cannot make sense of the state’s refusal to accommodate individuals where the law interferes with their deeply meaningful but nonmoral projects. An alternative justification, we argue, arises once one recognizes the connection between conscience and moral address: One’s lived moral convictions determine when and with what force one can hold others to account. Acting against one’s convictions can undermine one’s standing to blame others who act in similar ways. When the state compels someone to act against conscience, it renders her complicit in conduct she takes to be wrong and thereby impairs her ability to condemn similar conduct in the future, in a manner akin to the hypocrite. The reason the state should not compel people to act against conscience, then, is that doing so would undercut their moral standing.

Introduction to OSAR 6

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
David Shoemaker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
New Orleans ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Moral Testimony ◽  
Quality Of Will ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Standing To Blame

This introduction to the sixth volume of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility briefly discusses each of the new essays being published. They were drawn from the fourth biennial New Orleans Workshop in Agency and Responsibility (NOWAR), held November 2–4, 2017. The essays cover a wide range of topics relevant to agency and responsibility: the threat of neuroscience to free will; the relevance of moral emotions like shame, resentment, and guilt to responsibility; how control and self-control pertain to moral agency, oppression, and poverty; responsibility for joint agency; how one might take responsibility without blameworthy quality of will; what it means to have standing to blame others; the relevance of moral testimony to moral responsibility; and how thinking about blame better enables us to dissolve a dispute in moral philosophy between actualists and possibilists.

The Standing To Blame, or Why Moral Disapproval Is What It Is

dialectica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 183-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Riedener
Keyword(s):  
Standing To Blame

scholarly journals Punishing the Oppressed and the Standing to Blame

2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-295
Author(s):  
Andy Engen
Keyword(s):  
Standing To Blame

Skepticism about the Standing to Blame

2019 ◽  
pp. 265-288
Author(s):  
Matt King
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Standing To Blame

There are cases thought to illustrate that appropriate blame requires special standing. One might lack the standing to blame another because the fault is private and one is a stranger or because one is guilty of the very same offense and so one’s blame would be hypocritical. But despite its prevalence as an explanation of what goes wrong in such cases, the standing to blame itself has been given relatively little attention. The aim of this paper is to cast doubt on the standing to blame. It considers a range of plausible interpretations and, finding each wanting, concludes that those who wish to endorse the standing to blame owe us more by way of a characterization and defense. In raising this challenge, the paper motivates an alternative explanation of the cases.

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