Disagreement, Testimony, and Religious Understanding

In Chapter 2, questions about appropriate responses to religious disagreement are related to questions about appropriate responses to religious testimony. If it is appropriate to alter one’s credence on the basis of encountering a disagreeing peer, it is also appropriate to alter one’s credence in a religious proposition on the basis of encountering a testifier who is at least as competent and informed as oneself, when one is antecedently unopinionated on the matter at hand. However, recent literature on moral testimony should give one pause; there is distinctive value or importance in acquiring not merely knowledge but understanding. It is argued in this chapter that it may often also be inappropriate to adjust one’s credence on the basis of religious disagreement, for the reason that in so doing one would threaten or disincentivize one’s religious understanding.

Moral Testimony

The main aim of this chapter is to explore the importance of moral testimony for testifiers. Up to now, writers on moral testimony have by and large focused on how moral testimony impacts dependers. And, in doing so, they’ve tended to theorize about moral testimony assuming a rather abstracted picture of the testifier according to which all that really matters about her is that she’s a credible source. In contrast, this chapter shows how paying attention to the fact that testifiers are not just potential informants but also socially embedded moral agents helps us to discern heretofore unrecognized ways that moral testimony is valuable. More specifically, this chapter argues that dependence on moral testimony is valuable because it can promote the moral development of testifiers. Furthermore, dependence on moral testimony can be a way of respecting and standing by those who are oppressed in the face of their systematic moral subordination. And, finally, for oppressed persons, giving moral testimony can function as a way of resisting oppressive constructions of identity and expressing and retaining self-respect.

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 11

This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This 11th volume brings together 13 new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in the field, including moral conscientiousness and moral wrongness; impartiality and the boundaries of morality; moral testimony; Kant’s categorical imperative; and ethical theories as methods of ethics.

Introduction

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics features new work in normative ethical theory. This 11th volume includes chapters on the following topics: the significance of appreciation; the objective/subjective debate over wrongness; requests as a kind of wrong; the puzzle of taking comfort in the travails of others; finding meaning in one’s life; the boundaries of morality in light of the legitimacy of non-moral partialist pursuits; the value of moral testimony to those who testify; the category of “ordinary” wrongs that are not blameworthy; the practical role of Kant’s Categorical Imperative; the possibility of non-moral blame; reasons to reject the category of subjective obligation; how to understand the point of ethical theory; and the justification of social moral rules....

A Special Case

This chapter is concerned with moral assertion. In recent years, much attention has been given to the epistemic credentials of belief based on moral testimony. Some people think pure moral deference is wrong, others disagree. It comes as a surprise, however, that while the epistemic responsibilities of the receiver of moral testimony have been closely scrutinized, little discussion has focused on the epistemic duties of the speaker. This chapter defends a functionalist account of the normativity of moral assertion. According to this view, in virtue of its function of reliably generating moral understanding in the audience, a moral assertion that p needs be knowledgeable and accompanied by a contextually appropriate explanation why p.

Accepting Moral Testimony

This chapter clarifies the putatively problematic phenomenon: what it is to accept moral testimony, and what seems to be the basic problem with it. It argues that you accept testimony that p, just in case 1) you believe the testimony that p for a testimonial reason, and 2) either a) the testimonial reason to believe p in fact makes the difference whether you believe p, or b) would alone be enough for you to believe p were there no nontestimonial reasons to believe (or disbelieve) p. To identify what seems to be the basic problem with accepting moral testimony, we need to understand how morality fits in to this formula. Philosophers often claim that accepting pure moral testimony is problematic. This chapter distinguishes three different ways of understanding purity and identifies the specific sense of purity that characterizes the alleged problem.

Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Solidarity

This chapter contains two more arguments against pessimism about moral testimony. First, it argues that epistemic justice sometimes requires you to accept moral testimony, despite the fact that doing so seems to clash with autonomy. Both good and bad experiences teach a person what matters, and how much things matter. Those who systematically suffer have moral knowledge that others tend to lack, and whose testimony is routinely dismissed. Epistemic justice demands that we trust their moral testimony. Second, this chapter argues that prioritizing individual autonomy is in tension with another plausible claim: that epistemic solidarity is an important good. When you accept moral testimony, you and the speaker may thereby benefit from the epistemic solidarity that the two of you now stand together in, and that this epistemic solidarity is a moral good, a good you would forego by declining moral testimony on the grounds that to do so would compromise your own autonomy.