Is there a fact of the matter between direct reference theory and (neo-)Fregeanism?

2011 ◽  
Vol 154 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Balaguer
Keyword(s):  
Direct Reference ◽  
Reference Theory

scholarly journals Indexical Sinn: Fregeanism versus Millianism

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (39) ◽  
pp. 465
Author(s):  
João Branquinho
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Direct Reference ◽  
Cognitive Significance ◽  
De Re ◽  
General Conception ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
Reference Theory ◽  
Careful Assessment

This paper discusses two notational variance views with respect to indexical singular reference and content: the view that certain forms of Millianism are at bottom notational variants of a Fregean theory of reference, the Fregean Notational Variance Claim; and the view that certain forms of Fregeanism are at bottom notational variants of a direct reference theory, the Millian Notational Variance Claim. While the former claim rests on the supposition that a direct reference theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a neo-Fregean one by showing that it is bound to acknowledge certain senselike entities, the latter claim is based upon the supposition that a neo-Fregean theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a Millian one by showing that De Re senses are theoretically superfluous and hence eliminable. The question how many accounts of singular reference and content are we confronted with here — Two different (and mutually antagonistic) theories? Or just two versions of what is in essence the same theory? — is surely of importance to anyone interested in the topic. And this question should be answered by means of a careful assessment of the soundness of each of the above claims. Before trying to adjudicate between the two accounts, one would naturally want to know whether or not there are indeed two substantially disparate accounts. Grosso modo, if the Fregean Claim were sound then we would have a single general conception of singular reference to deal with, viz. Fregeanism; likewise, if the Millian Claim were sound we would be facing a single general conception of singular reference, viz. Millianism. My view is that both the Fregean Notational Variance Claim and its Millian counterpart are wrong, though naturally on different grounds. I have argued elsewhere that the Fregean Notational Variance Claim - considered in its application to the semantics of propositional-attitude reports involving proper names — is unsound. I intend tosupplement in this paper such a result by trying to show that the Millian Claim - taken in its application to the semantics of indexical expressions — should also be rated as incorrect. I focus on a certain set of arguments for the Millian Claim, arguments which I take as adequately representing the general outlook of the Millian theorist with respect to neo-Fregeanism about indexicals and which involve issues about the cognitive significance of sentences containing indexical terms.

Is Direct Reference Theory Incompatible with Physicalism?

2011 ◽  
Vol 108 (5) ◽  
pp. 255-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahrad Almotahari ◽  
Damien Rochford ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Direct Reference ◽  
Reference Theory

The foundations of Kaplan's direct reference theory for demonstratives

Philosophia ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 23 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 91-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence D. roberts
Keyword(s):  
Direct Reference ◽  
Reference Theory

scholarly journals Kant, the transcendental designation of I, and the direct reference theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 31
Author(s):  
Luca Forgione
Keyword(s):  
Direct Reference ◽  
The Self ◽  
Simple Representation ◽  
Reference Theory ◽  
Referential Function ◽  
Transcendental Apperception

The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. To begin with, what exactly does Kant mean when he states that I is a simple and empty representation? Secondly, can the features of the representation I and the correlative transcendental designation explain the indexical nature of the I? Thirdly, do the Kantian considerations on indexicality anticipate any of the semantic elements or, if nothing else, the spirit of the direct reference theory?

Comments on Paolo Bonardi’s “Coordination, Understanding, and Semantic Requirements”

2020 ◽  
pp. 491-495
Author(s):  
Kit Fine
Keyword(s):  
Direct Reference ◽  
Semantic Relationism ◽  
Reference Theory ◽  
Conceptual Foundations

Paolo Bonardi has written extensively and illuminatingly on direct reference theory, and I am grateful for his present comments on the conceptual foundations of semantic relationism. Central to the doctrine of semantic relationism is the relation of coordination. This is the relation that normally holds between two tokens of the name “Cicero” though not between a token of “Cicero” and a token of “Tully,” even though there is co-reference in both cases. Although the concept of coordination is central to semantic relationism I do not think of the doctrine as having exclusive claim on the concept. As I mention in ...

Counterfactual claims about fictional characters: philosophical and literary perspectives

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis Galván
Keyword(s):  
Literary Criticism ◽  
Direct Reference ◽  
Fictional Characters ◽  
Reference Theory

AbstractThe problems of making and evaluating counterfactual claims about fictional characters cannot be adequately handled without taking into account the practices of literary criticism, interpretation, and re-creation. The direct-reference theory of names explains only a subset of the phenomena of fiction and explains away the rest as irrelevant or pseudo-problems, whereas some criticisms of that theory bring in metaphysical concepts that may obscure the issue. This paper suggests that the indeterminacy of fictions and the conventions of the aforementioned practices are sufficient basis for explaining and assessing such counterfactual claims. In this view, fiction ceases to be understood as a phenomenon

An Inconsistency in Direct Reference Theory

2004 ◽  
Vol 101 (11) ◽  
pp. 574-593 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Bealer ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Direct Reference ◽  
Reference Theory

A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports

Noûs ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 361-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Schiffer
Keyword(s):  
Direct Reference ◽  
Belief Reports ◽  
Reference Theory
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