scholarly journals Indexical Sinn: Fregeanism versus Millianism

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (39) ◽  
pp. 465
Author(s):  
João Branquinho
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Direct Reference ◽  
Cognitive Significance ◽  
De Re ◽  
General Conception ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
Reference Theory ◽  
Careful Assessment

This paper discusses two notational variance views with respect to indexical singular reference and content: the view that certain forms of Millianism are at bottom notational variants of a Fregean theory of reference, the Fregean Notational Variance Claim; and the view that certain forms of Fregeanism are at bottom notational variants of a direct reference theory, the Millian Notational Variance Claim. While the former claim rests on the supposition that a direct reference theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a neo-Fregean one by showing that it is bound to acknowledge certain senselike entities, the latter claim is based upon the supposition that a neo-Fregean theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a Millian one by showing that De Re senses are theoretically superfluous and hence eliminable. The question how many accounts of singular reference and content are we confronted with here — Two different (and mutually antagonistic) theories? Or just two versions of what is in essence the same theory? — is surely of importance to anyone interested in the topic. And this question should be answered by means of a careful assessment of the soundness of each of the above claims. Before trying to adjudicate between the two accounts, one would naturally want to know whether or not there are indeed two substantially disparate accounts. Grosso modo, if the Fregean Claim were sound then we would have a single general conception of singular reference to deal with, viz. Fregeanism; likewise, if the Millian Claim were sound we would be facing a single general conception of singular reference, viz. Millianism. My view is that both the Fregean Notational Variance Claim and its Millian counterpart are wrong, though naturally on different grounds. I have argued elsewhere that the Fregean Notational Variance Claim - considered in its application to the semantics of propositional-attitude reports involving proper names — is unsound. I intend tosupplement in this paper such a result by trying to show that the Millian Claim - taken in its application to the semantics of indexical expressions — should also be rated as incorrect. I focus on a certain set of arguments for the Millian Claim, arguments which I take as adequately representing the general outlook of the Millian theorist with respect to neo-Fregeanism about indexicals and which involve issues about the cognitive significance of sentences containing indexical terms.

Walter Burley on Co-Signification in Opaque Contexts

2020 ◽  
pp. 221-247
Author(s):  
Nathaniel Bulthuis
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Analysis ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Direct Reference ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
The World ◽  
The Face ◽  
Walter Burley

Foreshadowing in many ways theories of direct reference popular today, Walter Burley (died c. 1345) favors a theory of direct signification, according to which names directly signify things in the world. But he recognizes that opaque contexts, such as propositional attitude reports, represent a challenge to that theory. In response, Burley develops a sophisticated account of our noetic states, one according to which those states can be individuated more finely than in terms of their contents. Paired with a certain semantic analysis of propositional attitude reports, that account of our noetic states is ready-made to accommodate Burley’s commitment to direct signification even in the face of opacity considerations.

scholarly journals Transparent Readings and Privileged Worlds

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-90
Author(s):  
Д.Б. Тискин
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Possible World ◽  
De Re ◽  
Attitude Reports

I present a problem for Sauerland’s [24] account of the restrictions on certain nonstandard de re readings in propositional attitude reports. Sauerland’s idea is to postulate the ontological prominence of the actual world so that no merely possible individual could have an actual counterpart. However, the problem Sauerland aims to solve extends to multiply nested attitude reports, where his prominence considerations are insufficient to explain either attested or non-attested readings. A solution I propose involves switching to tree-like possible world frames, thus creating an infinity of ontological levels. A remedy for Sauerland’s problem, the approach is shown to have shortcomings as regards the definability of factivity. DOI: 10.21146/2074-1472-2016-22-2-73-90

Puzzles of Coreference

2021 ◽  
pp. 87-141
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Significance ◽  
Singular Reference

This chapter deals with coreference puzzles, long regarded as bedrock data against which the adequacy of any theory of singular reference must ultimately be tested. The chapter argues that two-factor referentialism, introduced in Chapter 2, does the best job of solving them. It considers a number of coreference problems, old ones from Frege; newer ones from Kripke, Saul, Richard, and others; and some entirely new ones. It discusses some relevant syntactic issues and distinguishes intrinsic coreference from coincidental coreference. The view that names are individuated by spelling and pronunciation, such as the theory of “nambiguity” put forward by Perry and Korta, is rejected. It criticizes views that treat names as indexicals, as conflating importantly different instruments of reference. It criticizes the view that names are predicates, as having no reasons in its favor other than a misplaced desire for unity. It then develops the two-factor theory by comparing its treatment of cognitive significance with Frege’s views, and more recent views of Perry, Recanati, Fiengo, and May.

Propositional attitude statements

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Leibniz’S Law ◽  
Semantic Function ◽  
False Conclusion ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Apparent Violation ◽  
The Law ◽  
Indiscernibility Of Identicals

Propositional attitude statements – statements about our beliefs, desires, hopes and fears – exhibit certain logical peculiarities. For example, in apparent violation of Leibniz’s law of the indiscernibility of identicals, we cannot freely substitute expressions which designate the same object within such statements. According to Leibniz’s law, every instance of the following scheme is valid: - a = b - F(a) - Therefore, F(b) The validity of Leibniz’s law seems beyond question. It says, in effect, that if an object has a certain property, then anything identical to that object also has that property. Valid instances abound. But consider the following apparently invalid instance: - Hesperus is Phosphorus - Hammurabi believed that Hesperus often rose in the evening - Therefore, Hammurabi believed that ‘Phosphorus’ often rose in the evening. If we take ‘Hammurabi believed that…often rose in the evening’ to serve as the predicate F and ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ to be a and b respectively, this argument appears to be an instance of Leibniz’s law. Yet (3) apparently fails to follow from (1) and (2). Hammurabi believed that Hesperus and Phosphorus were two heavenly bodies not one. And he believed that Hesperus did, but that Phosphorus did not rise in the evening. We have derived a false conclusion from true premises and an apparently valid law. If that law is really valid, then our argument had better not be a genuine instance of the law. The tempting conclusion, widely accepted, is that we were wrong to construe propositional attitude statements as simple predications. We should not, that is, construe ‘Hammurabi believed that…often rose in the evening’ to be just a long predicate with the semantic function of attributing some property to the object commonly denoted by ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’. But then the question arises: if attitude reports are not simple predications, what are they? Philosophers have disagreed sharply in their answers. Moreover, their disagreements are intimately connected to a wide range of deep issues about the nature of meaning and reference.

Object recognition and content

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-226
Author(s):  
LYDIA SÁNCHEZ ◽  
MANUEL CAMPOS
Keyword(s):  
Object Recognition ◽  
Direct Reference ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Central Elements ◽  
Recognition Of Objects ◽  
Truth Value

Puzzles concerning attitude reports are at the origin of traditional theories of content. According to most of these theories, content has to involve some sort of conceptual entities, like senses, which determine reference. Conceptual views, however, have been challenged by direct reference theories and informational perspectives on content. In this paper we lay down the central elements of the more relevant strategies for solving cognitive puzzles. We then argue that the best solution available to those who maintain a view of content as truth conditions is to abandon the idea that content is the only element of mental attitudes that can make a difference as to the truth value of attitude reports. We finally resort to means of recognition of objects as one obvious element that helps explain differences in attitudes.

Is Direct Reference Theory Incompatible with Physicalism?

2011 ◽  
Vol 108 (5) ◽  
pp. 255-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahrad Almotahari ◽  
Damien Rochford ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Direct Reference ◽  
Reference Theory
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