Relativism, sceptical paradox, and semantic blindness

2011 ◽  
Vol 162 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-603 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Kindermann
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Blindness ◽  
Sceptical Paradox

Epistemic relativism and semantic blindness

Synthese ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 192 (3) ◽  
pp. 859-876 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin T. Rancourt
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Relativism ◽  
Semantic Blindness

Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s Sceptical Paradox: A Trilemma for Davidson

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Hossein Khani
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Alternative Solution ◽  
Speech Community ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Sceptical Paradox ◽  
Sceptical Argument

Davidson’s later philosophy of language has been inspired by Wittgenstein’s Investigations, but Davidson by no means sympathizes with the sceptical problem and solution Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein. Davidson criticizes the sceptical argument for relying on the rule-following conception of meaning, which is, for him, a highly problematic view. He also casts doubt on the plausibility of the sceptical solution as unjustifiably bringing in shared practices of a speech community. According to Davidson, it is rather success in mutual interpretation that explains success in the practice of meaning something by an utterance. I will argue that Davidson’s objections to the sceptical problem and solution are misplaced as they rely on a misconstrual of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s view. I will also argue that Davidson’s alternative solution to the sceptical problem is implausible, since it fails to block the route to the sceptical problem. I will then offer a problematic trilemma for Davidson.

scholarly journals Semantic Blindness: Repeated Concepts are Difficult to Encode and Recall under Time Pressure

1994 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald G MacKay ◽  
Michelle D Miller
Keyword(s):  
Serial Recall ◽  
Time Pressure ◽  
Inhibitory Effect ◽  
Repetition Blindness ◽  
Semantic Level ◽  
Semantic Blindness

This study demonstrates a recently predicted cognitive phenomenon known as semantic blindness, an inhibitory effect attributable to concept repetition in the serial recall of rapidly presented sentences Proficient bilinguals read mixed, Spanish-English sentences, each including a target and a pretarget word Targets and pretargets were related in three ways They were identical (e g, like-like), semantically identical across languages (e g, gusta-like), and nonidentical within or across languages (e g, read-like) Equivalent repetition blindness was found for targets with identical and semantically identical pretargets, indicating that repetition deficits were occurring solely at the semantic level, rather than at orthographic or phonological levels

scholarly journals Realist and antirealist interpretations of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations

2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-50
Author(s):  
Andrej Jandric
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Crispin Wright ◽  
Semantic Realism ◽  
Conceptual Distinction ◽  
Sceptical Paradox

The sceptical paradox which Kripke found in Wittgenstein?s rule-following considerations threatens the very notion of meaning. However, Kripke also offered a sceptical solution to it, according to which semantic sentences have no truth conditions, but their meaning is determined by assertability conditions instead. He presented Wittgenstein?s development as the abandoning of semantic realism of the Tractatus in favour of semantic antirealism, characteristic of Philosophical Investigations. Crispin Wright, although at points critical of Kripke?s interpretation, also understood the rule-following considerations as containing a crucial argument for antirealism. Contrary to Wright, John McDowell maintained that they offer a transcendental argument for realism. In this paper, I will argue that neither the realist nor the antirealist reading is faithfull to Wittgenstein, as his important conceptual distinction between criteria and symptoms is not adequately recoverable in any of them. Hence the upshot of rulefollowing considerations is that the distinction between realism and antirealism should not be articulated in terms of truth/assertability conditions.

scholarly journals What is the Sceptical Solution?

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Miller
Keyword(s):  
Private Language ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Sceptical Paradox

In chapter 3 of Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke’s Wittgenstein offers a “sceptical solution" to the sceptical paradox about meaning developed in chapter 2 (according to which there are no facts in virtue of which ascriptions of meaning such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” can be true). Although many commentators have taken the sceptical solution to be broadly analogous to non-factualist theories in other domains, such as non-cognitivism or expressivism in metaethics, the nature of the sceptical solution has not been well-understood. The main aim of this paper is to advance our understanding of the nature of the non-factualism about meaning proposed in the sceptical solution. It attempts to outline some desiderata that should be respected by interpretations of the sceptical solution and considers two objections raised against it in Barry Stroud’s paper “Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding and Community". It attempts to correct misconstruals of the sceptical solution that have been promulgated by Davidson and some of his followers and suggests that the sceptical solution developed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein is best viewed as a form of quasi-realism about meaning. It ends by outlining what it takes to be the most pressing challenges facing the sceptical solution.  

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