Epistemic austerity: limits to entitlement

Epistemic entitlement is a species of internalist warrant that can be had without any evidential support. Unfortunately, for this kind of warrant the so-called problem of demarcation arises, a form of epistemic relativism. I first present entitlement theory and examine what the problem of demarcation is exactly, rejecting that it is either based on bizarreness or disagreement in favour of the thesis that the problem of demarcation is based on epistemic arbitrariness. Second, I argue that arbitrariness generates a problem for entitlement because it undermines epistemic warrant. Third, I draw out some of the consequences that arbitrariness has for an entitlement epistemology, notably that it threatens to generalise to all our beliefs. Finally, I examine how different solutions to the problem of demarcation fare with respect to the danger of arbitrariness. I argue that none of the considered options succeeds in dealing with the risks of arbitrariness.

Epistemología de los profesores sobre el conocimiento matemático escolar: un estudio de caso

It was sought to know the epistemology of the teachers on school mathematical knowledge. The study was framed in the Socioepistemological Theory, understanding mathematics as a human activity from epistemic relativism. This qualitative study used microscopic analysis to form categories and then dialectically analyzed those categories. The investigative interest arose when observing the influence of Eurocentrism, the mono epistemisism of the school and the absence of some knowledge in teaching. The epistemology of the teacher influences his teaching and affects the school model as a tool for change or social continuity. The results showed that teachers mostly understand mathematics as a priori knowledge, assigning to human action the role of discovering, interpreting or formalizing it.

Notes on a complicated relationship: scientific pluralism, epistemic relativism, and stances

While scientific pluralism enjoys widespread popularity within the philosophy of science, a related position, epistemic relativism, does not have much traction. Defenders of scientific pluralism, however, dread the question of whether scientific pluralism entails epistemic relativism. It is often argued that if a scientific pluralist accepts epistemic relativism, she will be unable to pass judgment because she believes that “anything goes”. In this article, I will show this concern to be unnecessary. I will also argue that common strategies to differentiate relativism and pluralism fail. Building upon this analysis, I will propose a new way of looking at both positions’ relations. This article aims to understand what explains the friction between scientific pluralism and epistemic relativism. I will demonstrate that conceptualizing both epistemic relativism and scientific pluralism as “stances” sheds better light on their relation and demonstrates that it is, in principle, possible to support both positions at the same time. Preferred policies and levels of analysis, however, cause friction in practice.

God beyond the Boundary-Stones of Thought

In this paper, I make the case for epistemic relativism: the radical view that all human knowledge/truth is relative. I extend the application of epistemic relativism to include necessary laws such as the laws of logic. I argue that the truth of such laws are relative to human thought, which are ultimately instances derived from our experiences. These experiences act as limitations to which we are conceptually bound. As a result of this, we cannot apprehend God’s omnipotence. This includes God’s maximal power in being able toperform logically impossible actions. Our epistemic inability to conceive of such logically impossible actions is therefore testimony that God transcends the laws of logic.

Between Relativism and Design: The Limits of Hume's Secularity

Challenging the common image of Hume as a thoroughly secular philosopher, I argue that Hume occasionally relied on the design argument to defend the objectivity of values. Hume acknowledged that rejecting design might open the door to aesthetic, ethical, and epistemic relativism. To avoid this prospect, he allowed himself to repurpose the language of providential naturalists like Hutcheson and claim that “nature,” rather than God, has attuned our faculties to objective standards of morals, beauty, and truth. Historians of philosophy have treated such passages as merely figurative, as they conflict with fundamental principles in Hume's philosophy. I argue instead, from an intellectual historical perspective, that Hume nonetheless expects the passages to be read literally, since only the literal reading helps his case against relativism. Rather than recasting Hume as a defender of design, however, I argue that his appeals to design were less an integral part of his philosophy than a provisional compromise, a response to intractable tensions in the history of secularism.

Presentación Editorial

Para esta entrega hemos incluido ocho artículos de investigación, una carta al editor y una reseña. A continuación daremos más detalles sobre estos trabajos. El fascículo se abre con el artículo “Epistemic relativism and circularity” del investigador colombiano Oscar A. Piedrahita, radicado actualmente en los Estados Unidos y afiliado a la Universidad de California, Irvine.