Will and Volition: Personal Conditions of Possibility of Being an Agent

Will is a very old important philosophical concept, an analysis of which is very specific, if not odd, comparatively with the others (when it fruitfully proceeds in terms of criteria). This concept (‘will’) is going to be used to provide and clarify conditions of possibility for person of being an agent. In doing that I refer to the correspondent pieces of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations; and to their interpretations by M. Alvarez in “Wittgenstein on Action and Will” (2009) and D. K. Levy in “Morality without Agency” (2017). Person is essentially constituted by ‘powerless’ will in terms of ‘understanding’ that is experienced during her life. Action depends on and manifests understanding by will of a personal attitude to some states of affairs. Will does not incline a person to particular desires about preferable states of affairs or actions. Will is not about states of affairs. By willing I value the world, its portions, they appear significant, important to me. Volition is treated as related to will. Both are personal conditions of being an agent with priority of agency as capacity realized by rational actions.

MJO as a Gestalt

Objectively identifying a phenomenon from observation is often difficult. This essay reflects upon this problem from a philosophical perspective by taking the Madden-Julian oscillation (MJO) as an example. I argue that it can be considered as a problem of Gestalt. This concept is introduced by closely following Ludwig Wittgenstein’s two philosophical works, “Philosophical Investigations (Philosophische Untersuchungen)” and “Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie)”. Reflections upon the concept of Gestalt suggest why an objective identification of a phenomenon is so difficult. Importantly, the problem should not be reduced to that of a “pattern recognition”. Rather a given phenomenon must be considered as a whole, including a question of a driving mechanism.

Place Matters

This article positions place within a phenomenological framework. Current philosophical inquiry shows little interest in place, yet academic disciplines concerned with spatial properties look to philosophy—and in particular phenomenology—to provide important contributions to overcome the limitations of quantitative methodologies, particularly with respect to sentiments of attachment to and identification with places. Seemingly, however, philosophy offers little support in this field. Place disappears from philosophical investigations during the Middle Ages and is replaced by considerations on space. Keeping the employment of phenomenological approaches in other academic disciplines in mind, this article sets out to explore traces of a re-emerging interest in place among twentieth-century phenomenologists. It proposes a phenomenological approach to place in which there is a shift from regarding place in terms of a where to understanding what a place is in human experience.

Language-Games in the Later Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein

<p>1.1 When I first looked, into Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations I felt not so much that this was great work, but that it was alive and exciting, a going concern. I next learned of its difficulty; it seemed to me then (as it does now) that Wittgenstein omitted all the preliminary easy bits that we usually find in philosophy books and, treated only of the very difficult problems which concerned him. That this was great philosophy had to be accepted, for most of the people I knew of as top philosophers said so. Its acknowledged greatness was not, however, the primary reason, nor even an important reason, for my continued reading of Wittgenstein's work it was the enigmatic style and. the strange feeling of depth in the remarks; I felt they really did say something glorious, make a powerful gesture (cf., PI, *610), if I could only figure out what.</p>

Language-Games in the Later Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein

<p>1.1 When I first looked, into Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations I felt not so much that this was great work, but that it was alive and exciting, a going concern. I next learned of its difficulty; it seemed to me then (as it does now) that Wittgenstein omitted all the preliminary easy bits that we usually find in philosophy books and, treated only of the very difficult problems which concerned him. That this was great philosophy had to be accepted, for most of the people I knew of as top philosophers said so. Its acknowledged greatness was not, however, the primary reason, nor even an important reason, for my continued reading of Wittgenstein's work it was the enigmatic style and. the strange feeling of depth in the remarks; I felt they really did say something glorious, make a powerful gesture (cf., PI, *610), if I could only figure out what.</p>

On the Direction of Time: From Reichenbach to Prigogine and Penrose

The question why natural processes tend to flow along a preferred direction has always been considered from within the perspective of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, especially its statistical formulation due to Maxwell and Boltzmann. In this article, we re-examine the subject from the perspective of a new historico-philosophical formulation based on the careful use of selected theoretical elements taken from three key modern thinkers: Hans Reichenbach, Ilya Prigogine, and Roger Penrose, who are seldom considered together in the literature. We emphasize in our analysis how the entropy concept was introduced in response to the desire to extend the applicability of the Second Law to the cosmos at large (Reichenbach and Penrose), and to examine whether intrinsic irreversibility is a fundamental universal characteristics of nature (Prigogine). While the three thinkers operate with vastly different technical proposals and belong to quite distinct intellectual backgrounds, some similarities are detected in their thinking. We philosophically examine these similarities but also bring into focus the uniqueness of each approach. Our purpose is not providing an exhaustive derivations of logical concepts identified in one thinker in terms of ideas found in the others. Instead, the main objective of this work is to stimulate historico-philosophical investigations and inquiries into the problem of the direction of time in nature by way of crossdisciplinary examinations of previous theories commonly treated in literature as disparate domains.

Complexes, rule-following, and language games: Wittgenstein’s philosophical method and its relevance to semiotics

This paper forges links between early analytic philosophy and the posits of semiotics. I show that there are some striking and potentially quite important, but perhaps unrecognized, connections between three key concepts in Wittgenstein’s middle and later philosophy, namely, complex (Philosophical Grammar), rule-following (Philosophical Investigations), and language games (Philosophical Investigations). This reveals the existence of a conceptual continuity between Wittgenstein’s “early” and “later” philosophy that can be applied to the analysis of the iterability of representation in computer-generated images. Methodologically, this paper clarifies to at least some degree, the nature, progress and promise of an approach to doing philosophy and semiotics from a modally modest perspective that sees in the intellectual products of humanities, and not in unreflective empiricism, the future of scientific development. This hybrid, non-reductionist approach shows, among other things, that semiotic processes are encoded by specific types of complexes in computer-generated images that display iterability in time and space.