A new defense of trope content view of experience

2018 ◽  
Vol 176 (7) ◽  
pp. 1757-1768
Author(s):  
Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira
Keyword(s):  
Content View

The Representational View of Experience

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Berit Brogaard
Keyword(s):  
Visual Perception ◽  
Visual Experience ◽  
Naive Realism ◽  
Naïve Realism ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Central Claim ◽  
Content View

In chapter 3, the author presents two arguments for the view that visual experience is representational. The first shows that phenomenal ‘look’ and ‘seem’ reflect phenomenal, representational properties of visual perception. It follows that experience is representational. This conclusion is consistent with some versions of naive realism, but considerably stronger than the minimal content view that takes content to be a description of what it is like for the subject to have the experience. The second argument establishes that the perceptual relation that obtains between experience and its object in core cases cannot fully explain the phenomenology of experience. In order to explain its phenomenology, we will need to appeal to the experience’s representational nature. The second argument thus shows that visual experience is fundamentally representational and not fundamentally relational, which is the central claim of the representational view.

scholarly journals Engineering what? On concepts in conceptual engineering

Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steffen Koch
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Content ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Comprehensive Account ◽  
Conceptual Engineering ◽  
Content View

Abstract Conceptual engineers aim to revise rather than describe our concepts. But what are concepts? And how does one engineer them? Answering these questions is of central importance for implementing and theorizing about conceptual engineering. This paper discusses and criticizes two influential views of this issue: semanticism, according to which conceptual engineers aim to change linguistic meanings, and psychologism, according to which conceptual engineers aim to change psychological structures. I argue that neither of these accounts can give us the full story. Instead, I propose and defend the Dual Content View of Conceptual Engineering. On this view, conceptual engineering targets concepts, where concepts are understood as having two (interrelated) kinds of contents: referential content and cognitive content. I show that this view is independently plausible and that it gives us a comprehensive account of conceptual engineering that helps to make progress on some of the most difficult problems surrounding conceptual engineering.

The Singular Relational plus Relativistic Content View

Dialogue ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERTO HORÁCIO DE SÁ PEREIRA
Keyword(s):  
Relational View ◽  
Propositional Function ◽  
Complex Predicate ◽  
Content Of Experience ◽  
Content View

My aim is to defend a peculiar epistemic version of the particularity thesis, which results from a sui generis combination of what I call the ‘singular relational view’ and what I call the ‘relativistic content view.’ Particulars are not represented as part of putative singular content. Instead, we are perceptually acquainted with them in the relevant sense that experience puts us in direct perceptual contact with them. And the content of experience is best modelled as a propositional function, that is, the content of a complex predicate that is true or false only relative to some circumstances of evaluation.

The Apparent Factive Attitude View

Reasons First ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 101-124
Author(s):  
Mark Schroeder
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Content View ◽  
Better Than

Chapter 5 takes up the question of which way of developing a non-factive answer to what evidence perceptual experiences provide about the external world is most promising. Two forms of the apparent defeasibility of knowledge are introduced: objective defeat and subjective defeat. Each view’s resources for accounting for both objective and subjective defeat are compared, and it is argued that the non-factive content view fails to account for both objective and subjective defeat. In contrast, the apparent factive attitude view, because of its closer relationship to disjunctivist alternatives, is argued to offer clean treatments of both objective and subjective defeat—even better than the disjunctivist alternatives from which it borrows. The distinctive commitments of the apparent factive attitude view are defended, its distinctive treatment of the bootstrapping problem for dogmatism is introduced, and the resulting view is contrasted with Matthew McGrath’s objective looks theory.

Other Arguments from ‘Look’

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Berit Brogaard
Keyword(s):  
Visual Experience ◽  
Content View

The notion of phenomenal look has been invoked in various contexts to argue for a range of philosophical positions. Chisholm appealed to his non-comparative looks to argue for the theory of appearing. Jackson made appeal to this notion in an argument for the sense-datum theory. More recently, Susanna Siegel and Susanna Schellenberg have provided arguments that rest on the notion of phenomenal looks to argue for the view that visual experience has content. And Kathrin Glüer has invoked this notion to argue for the view that visual experiences are beliefs with phenomenal-look contents. In this chapter, the author provides an overview of these arguments and offers some reasons for thinking that only the arguments in favor of what Siegel has called ‘the weak content view’ succeed.

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