Naïve Realism and the Colors of Afterimages

Along with hallucinations and illusions, afterimages have shaped the philosophical debate about the nature of perception. Often referred to as optical or visual illusions, experiences of afterimages have been abundantly exploited by philosophers to argue against naïve realism. This paper offers an alternative account to this traditional view by providing a tentative account of the colors of the afterimages from an objectivist perspective. Contrary to the widespread approach to afterimages, this paper explores the possibility that the colors of afterimages are not ontologically different from “ordinary” colors and that experiences of afterimages fail to provide a motivation for rejecting naïve realism.

Awareness of the Psychological Bias of Naïve Realism Can Increase Acceptance of Cultural Differences

Acceptance of cultural differences can contribute to diversity. However, naïve realism—the conviction that one’s views are objective whereas others’ are biased—might hinder intercultural coexistence. We tested, in three experimental studies, whether a cognitive strategy based on raising awareness of the naïve realism, without any reference to culture and free of emotional involvement, can have a beneficial effect on cultural acceptance. Results revealed that participants showed more acceptance of cultural differences once they were aware of this bias (Study 1). The intervention had an indirect effect on acceptance via openness, especially for participants higher in prejudice (Study 2). Participants aware of this bias could not maintain an enhanced self-view, which mediated the effect of the manipulation on acceptance (Study 3). These findings suggest that strategies based on “cold” cognition, without an explicit emphasis on culture, might be beneficial for increasing the acceptance of cultural differences in an era of xenophobia.

Perceptual Idealism and Phenomenal Geometry

My account of 3D vision attempts to preserve many of the traditional commitments of naïve realism, whilst rejecting its central tenet of mind-independence. In this fourth post I explain why this provides a more satisfactory solution to variations in scene geometry with viewing conditions than recent ‘four-dimensional’ accounts.

Bridging the Gap? Naïve Realism and the Problem of Consciousness

How should we decide between philosophical theories of perception? This paper addresses this question by considering the debate between naïve realists and their opponents, and in particular the claim that naïve realism provides a distinctive way of resolving the Problem of Consciousness. I argue that the naïve realist’s solution requires rejecting what many consider to be a ‘fixed point’ in theorizing about perception: a commitment to physicalism. In light of this, I consider different ways of understanding naïve realism and its motivation, suggesting that naïve realism might be best understood as a transcendental theory of perception.

Neopragmatism and Philosophy of Perception

Neopragmatism is an anti-metaphysical approach to philosophical problems. It addresses such problems by taking the focus off of metaphysics, and turning it onto language. That is, the neopragmatist seeks philosophically uncontentious explanations of the sort of talk that often gives rise to the sense that there is a deep philosophical puzzle to solve. In the domain of perception, reflection on apt ways of describing perceptual experiences have led to various metaphysically committing theories, including (i) sense data theory, (ii) representationalism, and (iii) naïve realism. This chapter uses neopragmatist techniques to undermine the case for the last of these. The attack is two-pronged. First, some of the metaphysical commitments of naïve realism are criticized. Second, neopragmatism is used to explain some of the ideas that were thought to lend naïve realism support. These include the idea that perceptual experience has a peculiar sort of openness or presentational character, and the related idea that such experience gives insight into the mind-independent character of the world. Beyond forming the basis for criticizing other views, neopragmatism also suggests a positive view of perception. This is a form of adverbialism that relies on the idea that our sensory states are information-bearing, but not, in any robust sense, representational.

Wading in the Shallows

One understanding of naturalism about perception allows that results in the sciences bearing on the senses may have an impact upon philosophical theorizing on perception. Its opponents reject or, at least, are much more wary about this possibility. I consider two cases: the implications of prediction error theories for naïve realism and the latest empirical research on cross modal illusions, and taste, for the traditional division of the senses into five. Although in neither case are the implications straightforward, I argue that there is a tension in the first case, relating to naïve realism, given the structure of the debate against representationalism, what naïve realists say about hallucination, and assertion of the significant differences between perception and cognition. In the second, the conflict is avoided by recognizing distinctive features of how senses are integrated and realized, and a new personal level of explanation.

Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Perception

This paper focuses on two debates: the Metaphysical debate over intentionalism and naïve realism, and the Psychological debate over constructivist and ecological theories. While these two debates are generally assumed to be orthogonal, it is difficult to specify the grounds for this assumption. The chapter considers the usual strategies for distinguishing between philosophical and scientific theories—such as appeals to modal strength, methodology, or explanatory features—and suggests that they do not apply in this case. It argues that both debates rely on inference to the best explanation to draw contingent conclusions about the constitutive nature of perceptual experience. The chapter also claims that the distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations will not separate the two debates unless we are already committed to the idea that the metaphysics of mind must be conducted at one particular level of explanation. It concludes that the two debates are engaged in the same general project concerning the nature of perception, and that the Psychological theories are no less metaphysical than the Metaphysical theories.