What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?

Richard Pettigrew

doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01377-y

What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?

Philosophical Studies ◽

10.1007/s11098-019-01377-y ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 177 (11) ◽

pp. 3427-3463 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Richard Pettigrew

Keyword(s):

Bayesian Epistemology

AbstractConditionalization is one of the central norms of Bayesian epistemology. But there are a number of competing formulations, and a number of arguments that purport to establish it. In this paper, I explore which formulations of the norm are supported by which arguments. In their standard formulations, each of the arguments I consider here depends on the same assumption, which I call Deterministic Updating. I will investigate whether it is possible to amend these arguments so that they no longer depend on it. As I show, whether this is possible depends on the formulation of the norm under consideration.

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Philosophy’s rematch: A new conceptualization of the study of higher education

Arts and Humanities in Higher Education ◽

10.1177/14740222211002967 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 147402222110029

Author(s):

Gabe A Orona

Keyword(s):

Higher Education ◽

Education Research ◽

Virtue Epistemology ◽

Bayesian Epistemology ◽

Higher Education Research ◽

Field Of Study ◽

Research Philosophy ◽

Development Of Students

In recent decades, philosophy has been identified as a general approach to enhance the maturity of higher education as a field of study by enriching theory and method. In this article, I offer a new set of philosophical recommendations to spur the disciplinary development of higher education, departing from previous work in several meaningful ways. Due to their deep and useful connections to higher education research, philosophy of measurement, virtue epistemology, and Bayesian epistemology are introduced and discussed in relation to their conceptual association and potential practical influence on the study of higher education. The culmination of these points signals a learnercentered lens focused on the development of students.

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Epistemology without guidance

Philosophical Studies ◽

10.1007/s11098-021-01655-8 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Nick Hughes

Keyword(s):

Normative Theory ◽

Bayesian Epistemology ◽

Theory Choice ◽

Normative Epistemology

AbstractEpistemologists often appeal to the idea that a normative theory must provide useful, usable, guidance to argue for one normative epistemology over another. I argue that this is a mistake. Guidance considerations have no role to play in theory choice in epistemology. I show how this has implications for debates about the possibility and scope of epistemic dilemmas, the legitimacy of idealisation in Bayesian epistemology, uniqueness versus permissivism, sharp versus mushy credences, and internalism versus externalism.

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