Epistemic Emotions and Co-inquiry: A Situated Approach

This paper discusses the virtue epistemology literature on epistemic emotions and challenges the individualist, unworldly account of epistemic emotions. It argues that epistemic emotions can be truth-motivating if embedded in co-inquiry epistemic cultures, namely virtuous epistemic cultures that valorise participatory processes of inquiry as truth-conducive. Co-inquiry epistemic cultures are seen as playing a constitutive role in shaping, developing, and regulating epistemic emotions. Using key references to classical Pragmatism, the paper describes the bridge between epistemic emotions and co-inquiry culture in terms of habits of co-inquiry that act as the scaffolding of epistemic emotions. The result is a context-sensitive and practice-oriented approach to epistemic emotions that conceives of those emotions as being shaped by co-inquiry epistemic cultures.

Internalism, Externalism, and Autonomous Belief

What must be the case for an autonomous belief condition on knowledge (motivated in Chapter 1) to be satisfied by a knower? Chapter 2 takes up this question by investigating whether or not the knowledge-relevant (viz., epistemic) autonomy of a belief is determined entirely by the subject’s present mental structure. What I’ll call ‘internalists’ about epistemically autonomous belief say ‘yes’, and externalists say ‘no.’ Internalism about epistemic autonomous belief turns out to be problematic for reasons entirely independent from those we might have for rejecting internalist approaches to epistemically justified belief. What is shown to fare much better is a kind of ‘history-sensitive’ externalist approach to epistemically autonomous belief. On the particular account I go in for, which draws from externalist thinking about attitudinal autonomy more generally (as well as from virtue epistemology), a belief lacks the kind of epistemic autonomy that’s needed for propositional knowledge if the subject comes to possess the belief in a way that (put simply) bypasses or pre-empts the subject’s cognitive abilities and is such that the subject lacks easy (enough) opportunities to competently shed that belief.

Know-How, Performance Enhancement, and Guidance Control

If intellectualism about knowledge-how is true (and so, if knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that), then to the extent that we need an autonomy condition on know-how, it will be (simply) an autonomy condition on know-that: a condition on propositional knowledge-apt belief. However, the anti-intellectualist—according to whom know-how is fundamentally dispositional rather than propositional—would need an entirely different story here––one that places an autonomy-related restriction not on propositional-knowledge-apt belief but, instead, on know-how-apt dispositions. Chapter 4 develops exactly this kind of restriction, by cobbling together some ideas about know-how and virtue epistemology with recent thinking in the moral responsibility literature about freedom, responsibility, and manipulation. The proposal is that one is in a state of knowing how to do something, φ‎, only if one has the skill to φ‎ successfully with guidance control, and one’s φ‎-ing exhibits guidance control (and furthermore, manifests know-how) only if one’s φ‎-ing is caused by a reasons-responsive mechanism that one owns. Unsurprisingly, the devil is in these details—and this chapter aims to spell them out in a way that rules out certain kinds of radical performance enhancing cases while not ruling out that, say, one knows how to do a maths problem when one’s performance is just mildly boosted by Adderall.

Autonomous Knowledge

A central conclusion developed and defended throughout the book is that epistemic autonomy is necessary for knowledge (both knowledge-that and knowledge-how) and in ways that epistemologists have not yet fully appreciated. The book is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 motivates (using a series of twists on Lehrer’s TrueTemp case) the claim that propositional knowledge requires autonomous belief. Chapters 2 and 3 flesh out this proposal in two ways, by defending a specific form of history-sensitive externalism with respect to propositional knowledge-apt autonomous belief (Chapter 2) and by showing how the idea that knowledge requires autonomous belief—understood along the externalist lines proposed—corresponds with an entirely new class of knowledge defeaters (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 extends the proposal to (both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist) knowledge-how and performance enhancement, and in a way that combines insights from virtue epistemology with research on freedom, responsibility, and manipulation. Chapter 5 concludes with a new twist on the Value of Knowledge debate, by vindicating the value of epistemically autonomous knowledge over that which falls short, including (mere) heteronomous but otherwise epistemically impeccable justified true belief.

Dare to Think?

The previous two chapters argued that beliefs are pervasively outsourced to other people and to the environment, and that belief revision often occurs in response to changes in the cues that scaffold our beliefs. In light of these facts, we need to ensure the scaffolding of better beliefs. We need, that is, to manage the epistemic environment. Many people are uncomfortable with this suggestion, and urge that instead we should improve beliefs by promoting better reasons. This chapter examines the prospects for better individual reason, focusing on virtue epistemology. It argues that individual cognition is extremely unreliable, however virtuously it is conducted. Focusing on Quassim Cassam’s recent book on intellectual vices, it works through case studies, from climate denial and from historical scholarship, to show just how limited individual cognition is. It argues that even genuine experts are at severe risk of error when they stray outside their own sphere of expertise, and that spheres of expertise are much narrower than we tend to think.

Long tail metaphysics: The epistemic crisis and intellectual freedom

In reaction to the epistemic crisis, efforts to restrict free expression and access to information have not only failed to preserve the truth, but sometimes also suppressed it. Libraries’ commitment to intellectual freedom creates unique opportunities to deliver alternative solutions. By renewing the emphasis on intellectual freedom in core library functions like collections, education, and programming, libraries can provide the epistemic resources that patrons need amidst a broader context of distrust, manipulation, and censorship. This essay examines the epistemic crisis in the USA in light of intellectual freedom and the IFLA Statement on Libraries and Intellectual Freedom. Organized into three parts, this piece explores plurality as normative in the human condition, considers the impact of information and communications technology on free expression and the legitimacy of information institutions, and reconciles the emerging tensions by applying concepts from virtue epistemology to intellectual freedom. The essay concludes with considerations for library practice.

What Are Self-Cultivation Philosophies?

The chapter defines the concept of a self-cultivation philosophy. This proposes that human beings can and should move from a troubled state of existence to some ideal state of being via spiritual exercises guided by some philosophical analysis. Philosophy is defined as a reflective practice that seeks understanding of fundamental assumptions in our life. Philosophy may be a practical discipline or a theoretical one, and it may be based on whatever cognitive capacities human beings possess, including reason and awareness. This claim is defended by reference to virtue epistemology. Self-cultivation philosophy has a four-part structure: an account of human nature, an existential starting point, an ideal state of being, and a transformation program. The transformation program consists of exercises which have four functions: Cognition, Purification, Doctrine, and Habituation. Self-cultivation philosophies are often expressed in transformational texts intended to guide people in how to live their lives according to the philosophy

Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, and Virtue

This chapter offers an overview of how virtue-based concepts have been used by philosophers of science to shed light on epistemic aspects of science. In the epistemology of science, the word virtue has referred to two different concepts. First, virtue can be understood as excellence, where excellence is a quality of a model, a theory, or a hypothesis. Second, virtue can be understood more narrowly as a stable character trait and/or disposition of scientists themselves. The first meaning is connected to the long-standing debate on the qualities that make a scientific theory a good scientific theory. The second meaning is connected to a much more recent conversation exploring the connections between virtue epistemology and philosophy of science. I explore how these two meanings of virtue have been developed, and I highlight underexplored areas that can advance our understanding of the relation between virtue theory and philosophy of science.